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Community contributions are often required as part of community-driven development (CDD) 
programmes, with payment encouraged through matching grants. However, little remains 
known about the impact of matching grants, or the implications of requiring community 
contributions in order for communities to receive development funding.  
 
This paper describes research where we partner with two non-governmental organisations 
(NGOs) – one international and one Somali – and undertake a randomised control trial of a 
CDD matching grant programme designed to incentivise informal contributions for local 
public goods in Gedo region in south-central Somalia. We rely on household survey data 
collected from 1,297 respondents in 31 treatment and 31 control communities, as well as 
surveys of village leaders and data on informal contributions from the mobile money platform 
used by community leaders to collect revenue.  
 
Two key findings emerge. First, our research shows that working with communities and 
incentivising informal revenue generation can be an effective way to deliver public goods and 
to support citizens and communities. Second, building on research exploring the potential for 
development interventions to spur virtuous or adverse cycles of governance, we show that 
development partners may work directly with community leaders and informal taxing 
institutions without necessarily undermining – and indeed perhaps strengthening – state 
legitimacy and related ongoing processes of statebuilding in the country. Indeed, despite 
playing no direct role in the matching grant programme, taxpayer perceptions of the 
legitimacy of the local government improved as a result of the programme. These findings 
deepen our understanding of how community contributions may be incentivised through 
matching grant programmes, and how they may contribute to CDD and public goods 
provision in a context of weak institutional capacity. 
 
Keywords: informal taxation; informal revenue generation; community contributions; 
matching grants; community-driven development; experimental methods; Somalia. 
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1  Introduction 
 
Community-driven development (CDD) has long been embraced by international 
development partners as a means of delivering public goods and strengthening social capital 
and cohesion (White et al. 2018), particularly in fragile contexts (Fearon et al. 2009; Strand et 
al. 2003; World Bank 2015). By one estimate, the World Bank alone lends more than US$2 
billion a year in support of CDD programmes (Mansuri and Rao 2004). To receive external 
support, CDD projects often require co-financing from communities through informal taxes – 
non-market payments that are not required or defined by state law, and are enforced outside 
the state legal system. Co-financing is often incentivised through CDD grants, with the 
requirement for informal taxes largely justified based on the belief that they will create a 
greater sense of ownership over projects and increase their sustainability (Aga et al. 2018; 
Carvalho and White 2004; Rawlings et al. 2004).  
 
As a growing body of evidence shows that informal taxation is regressive (Olken and Singhal 
2011; Paler et al. 2017; van den Boogaard et al. 2019; van den Boogaard and Santoro 2021; 
Walker 2018), the benefits of local co-financing should outweigh the negative distributional 
impacts. However, and despite being widely embraced by development partners and donors 
and incorporated into CDD programmes, there is limited evidence about the impact of co-
financing requirements (Tendler 2000). As evidence suggests that CDD programmes build 
on rather than build social capital (Isham and Kähkönen 2002; Vajja and White 2008), it is 
unclear whether CDD programmes can incentivise informal revenue generation and local 
collective action. At the same time, though it is often assumed that matching grant 
programmes requiring community contributions will lead to more positive public goods 
outcomes than external aid alone, there is little evidence of this outcome in practice. Reviews 
of CDD programmes and meta-analyses often point to negative outcomes and the risk of 
elite capture (Carrick-Hagenbarth 2016; Ensminger 2017; Hedlund et al. 2013; Humphreys et 
al. 2012; Kumar and Corbridge 2002; McCarthy et al. 2016; Mosse 2005; Vajja and White 
2008; Van Domelen 2003; White 1999). Indeed, it is plausible that local revenue 
requirements lead to coercive revenue-raising tactics, with revenue used primarily to benefit 
local elites.  
 
Beyond the effectiveness of co-financed CDD programmes, little is known about the impact 
of requiring co-financing through informal community contributions for state and non-state 
governance actors. It is not clear whether co-financing requirements serve to ‘crowd out’ 
other forms of formal and informal revenue-raising, and whether working with informal taxing 
institutions outside the state negatively affects state legitimacy. While there is a broader 
literature on the ways in which non-state service provision (e.g. Cammett and MacLean 
2014) and aid (e.g. Baldwin and Winters 2018, 2020; Montinola et al. 2020) are likely to 
affect state and state-citizen relationships, there has been more limited exploration of the 
impact of development partners bypassing the state through CDD and requiring informal 
taxation as a condition of receiving aid (Parker and Serrano 2000; Tendler and Serrano 
1999). 
 
We explore these research gaps through a randomised control trial of a CDD programme in 
Gedo region in south-central Somalia, which made use of matching grants to incentivise 
informal contributions for local public goods. This CDD programme, known as the 
DIALOGUE (Develop Informed and Accountable Local Governance through User 
Empowerment) programme, was implemented by two NGOs – one international and one 
Somali. It involved two interventions: a grant, matching or surpassing revenue raised 
informally by communities, and a set of measures aimed at increasing oversight over 
communities’ management of informal revenue, including using an online contribution and 
payment tracking platform. We capture the views of citizens, local leaders and objective 
assessments of the programme’s impact across communities that received these 
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interventions (treatment communities) and those that did not (control communities), before 
and after the programme implementation. Through this, we offer an important empirical 
perspective on the impacts of a CDD programme in a challenging context – contributing to 
limited knowledge about co-financing development, and offering a relatively rare assessment 
of aid in Somalia.1 
 
Two key sets of findings emerge. First, we find that the CDD programme in Gedo region was 
effective in both incentivising informal revenue generation and in delivering better quality 
public goods outcomes. Treatment communities were more likely than control communities 
to undertake a new development project and to raise new informal revenue to finance public 
goods. They were also more likely to be satisfied with the public goods outcomes and to 
perceive greater fiscal reciprocity of informal contributions, supported by more positive 
objective assessments of the new community development projects. These findings are 
positive, somewhat surprisingly given the cited risks of elite capture. We believe they can be 
explained in part through the mechanisms of accountability that were embedded within the 
transparent and participatory programme design. For example, individuals in treatment 
communities were more likely to perceive their rights to make demands on local leaders and 
to play a role in monitoring local revenues and projects. There is also a long history of 
extensive and relatively effective non-state and informal revenue generation and service 
delivery in the context of south-central Somalia (see van den Boogaard and Santoro 2021).  
 
Second, we show that the CDD programme with co-financing requirements did not crowd out 
other forms of revenue-raising, and, importantly, did not undermine perceptions of the 
legitimacy of the local state and some non-state governance actors. Instead, citizen 
perceptions of the legitimacy of the local government – their willingness to accept the 
authority of the local government to levy taxes – increased as a result of the programme. 
This is striking, particularly as the local government had no direct role in the CDD 
programme. In exploring the mechanisms through which these outcomes emerge, we find no 
evidence of false attribution, partial evidence that legitimacy was strengthened through more 
frequent interactions with leaders, and strong evidence that the positive relationship emerged 
through shifts in perception of the transparency, trust and performance of local leaders. This 
indicates that where informal revenue generation helps to finance valued public goods, 
taxpayers may view state actors as doing their job even if they do not have a direct role in 
the financing or delivery of public goods.  
 
These findings deepen our understanding of how community contributions may be 
incentivised through matching grant programmes, and may contribute to CDD and public 
goods provision in a context of weak state institutional capacity. We thus contribute to 
literature on the ways in which CDD programmes can increase social capital and local 
collective action (Casey et al. 2013; Fearon et al. 2009), and on the capacity of externally-
funded programmes to catalyse contributions for public goods (Milner et al. 2016; Montinola 
et al. 2020). We provide evidence that matching grants may be effectively used to incentivise 
informal contributions that are enforced through social mechanisms. At the same time, our 
findings about spillover effects have important implications for our understanding of the 
relationships and potential complementarity between informal taxing institutions, external 
financing and the state in a context of weak state institutional capacity (Baldwin 2015, 2019; 




1  Hagmann (2016: 19) notes that: ‘The absence of systematic and independent assessments’ of aid programmes in 
Somalia ‘makes it difficult to judge their effectiveness and durability’. Ingiriis (2018: 59) notes the rarity of research that 
captures Somali voices: ‘Most of those studying Somalia write from the comfort zones of the Ivory Tower in the West, or 
spend a few months in Kenya when they could not spend a few hours in the Mogadishu airport’. 
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As we will explore further, these findings also have important implications for how 
development partners deliver aid and engage with informal taxing actors outside the state in 
contexts of weak formal statehood. In Somalia, international development partners and 
donors often rely on local leaders and informal institutions to deliver services and aid in the 
region, though are simultaneously invested in strengthening formal state capacity and reach 
throughout the country. Our evidence suggests that development partners may work with 
communities and community leaders to co-finance development without necessarily 
undermining state actors – and potentially actually strengthening the state’s legitimacy. 
Despite these possibilities, we highlight continued and significant risks of requiring co-
financing within CDD programmes, including the important risks of a lack of accountability of 
local leaders, the exclusion of minorities and sub-populations, the reinforcement of 
inequitable public goods financing, and the entrenchment of non-universal conceptions of 
citizenship and rights. 
 
We develop these arguments throughout this paper. In Section 2, we describe the context of 
CDD and informal taxation in south-central Somalia, identifying key gaps in the literature on 
CDD with respect to the role and impacts of co-financing requirements. Section 3 explains 
the experimental research design, while Section 4 details the data upon which the study 
relies. Section 5 presents the main results of our analysis, exploring the effects of the 
matching grant programme on informal contributions to public goods, public goods 
outcomes, formal and informal revenue spillovers, and citizen perceptions of state and non-
state governance actors. Section 6 summarises our key findings, situates them within the 
broader literature, and reflects on the limitations and external validity of our findings. Section 
7 considers the implications for development partners and the state in the region, while 
flagging important risks of co-financing requirements – despite the positive results that we 
find in Gedo region. Section 8 concludes and suggests productive new avenues for research 
based on our findings.  
 
 
2  Background: informal revenue generation 
and CDD in south-central Somalia 
 
At less than 3 per cent in 2018 Somalia has the lowest tax-to-GDP ratio in the world, and has 
long faced challenges of weak centralised authority and capacity (Raballand and 
Knebelmann 2020). In practice, the Federal Government of Somalia (FGS) does not collect 
taxes outside the capital region, and, even there, collects little apart from customs taxes. 
Jubbaland state has particularly poor revenue collection capacity, with estimated per capita 
tax revenue amounting to just US$6.2 in 2018 (Raballand and Knebelmann 2020). In Gedo 
region in Jubbaland state, we find that less than a fifth of households pay any formal taxes, 
with few households paying anything apart from livestock taxes (van den Boogaard and 
Santoro 2021). 
 
In this context of weak centralised state authority, and building on a history of pre-colonial 
decentralised authority, south-central Somalia is characterised by a rich network of local 
governance institutions and community-based informal revenue generation.2 Self-reliance, 
self-help, and hybrid governance between state and non-state authorities, as well as 
between non-state actors and community leaders, have been ‘more the norm than the 
exception’ (Varming 2019: 6; see also Menkhaus 2006, 2014b; Jordan 2016; Hagmann and 
Hoehne 2009), particularly since the outbreak of civil war in 1988 and the collapse of the 
 
2  This is in line with a growing body of literature that shows that areas of limited statehood do not necessarily lack 
institutionalised modes of governance and service provision (Arjona et al. 2015; De Herdt and Titeca 2019; Menkhaus 
1998, 2006; Risse 2011; Risse and Stollenwerk 2018: 406). 
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state in 1991. Private actors, NGOs and international organisations undertake most service 
delivery and infrastructure development (Menkhaus 2006: 90, 2014b; Saggiomo 2011; 
Schäferhoff 2014; UNSC 2018; Varming 2019: 6).3 Community leaders and traditional 
authorities, including clan elders and religious leaders, play an important role in local 
governance, conflict resolution and local public goods provision, including security and social 
welfare.4 As in many contexts, ‘informal taxation is one of the primary ways through which 
local public goods are financed’ (Olken and Singhal 2011: 12).5 Capturing a range of informal 
payments to support the provision of local public goods, security, social welfare and clan 
governance, in 2017 in Gedo region 71 per cent of households reported paying at least one 
informal tax or fee in the previous year, with informal contributions representing on average 
9.5 per cent of annual household income (van den Boogaard and Santoro 2021).6 Among 
these payments, informal taxes and contributions to support systems of social welfare and 
social protection and local public goods provision are particularly important.7 In the absence 
of state service provision, households commonly contribute to the maintenance or 
construction of community development projects, including roads, mosques, public markets, 
water provision, schools and garbage collection.  
 
Given limited state capacity, a rich and active network of informal institutions and non-state 
actors, and what is often described as a strong foundation of local collective action 
(Hammond et al. 2011; Menkhaus 2006, 2014b; Saggiomo 2011; van den Boogaard and 
Santoro 2021; Varming 2019),8 international development partners in Somalia have long 
relied on development delivery modalities outside the state.9 This has often involved working 
directly with communities and community leaders through CDD programmes, which, as 
described above, are more broadly embraced by development partners and donors. 
Motivated by Sen’s concepts of capabilities and agency (Nussbaum and Sen 1993), and 
Ostrom’s notions of social capital and collective action (Ostrom 1994), the logic of CDD is 
 
3  As described by a senior official of a telecommunications company, who noted: ‘We are doing all the government’s work 
- droughts, rains, IDPs, illnesses. We are the only ones there, so we help. Why? Because of our Somalinimo 
[Somaliness or sense of nationalism]’ (cited in Abshir et al. 2020).  
4  In line with political science literature, we define local public goods as goods that are geographically targeted and confer 
benefits on multiple community members, rather than the stricter economic definition (see e.g. Tiebout 1956). Examples 
include public schools and water wells. 
5  As noted above, informal taxation and revenue generation refers to non-market payments that are not required or 
defined by state law and are enforced outside the state legal system, with payments that can be made in cash, in kind or 
through labour contributions (van den Boogaard, 2020b). According to this definition, state or non-state actors may levy 
informal taxes – what matters is whether the taxes have a formal legal basis and revenue reaches the formal public 
budget. Informal revenue generation serves as an umbrella concept that captures a range of different informal 
payments: some look more like user fees to access specific services, some look more like taxes to collectively finance 
public goods, some finance informal governance institutions and systems of social welfare, some are defined by state 
law but their revenue doesn’t reach state coffers, and some look more like protection payments or extortion for the 
provision of security, with little choice of whether to pay or not. For a deeper discussion of these conceptual complexities 
inherent to the concepts of informal taxation and revenue generation, see van den Boogaard (2020b: 51–65) and van 
den Boogaard et al. (2019). 
6  For more explanation of the types of payments and informal taxing institutions captured by this study, see van den 
Boogaard and Santoro (2021: 18-25). At the same time, many communities are connected with rich transnational 
networks of diaspora, who likewise engage in and support informal local revenue-raising and contribute to community 
development projects, often in towns and villages associated with the clan of the diaspora contributors (Hammond et al. 
2011; Jordan 2016; Menkhaus 2014c). 
7  In line with Cammett and MacLean (2014), we use the term ‘social welfare’ to refer to health, education and support for 
poor and disadvantaged groups, while ‘social protection’ refers to social assistance for the poor and social insurance for 
the vulnerable (see Getu and Devereux 2013: 3; World Bank 2001: 4).  
8  As described by analyst Rashid Abdi, Somalis have a ‘higher-than-average “culture of sharing” … [that] mitigates the 
worst manifestations of poverty’ (R. Abdi, personal communication, 20 March 2020). 
9  While CDD programmes are often undertaken with the logic of building social capital, evidence suggests that these 
programmes may be more effective where there is a pre-existing high level of existing social capital within communities 
(Vajja and White 2008), as in certain regions in south-central Somalia. For instance, Jordan (2016) shows the feasibility 
of CDD in Somalia, finding that in the absence of the government, the diaspora and communities have successfully 
delivered social services through a model similar to CDD. For a broader discussion of CDD and its potential in Somalia 
see Bakonyi et al. (2015); Bryld and Kamau (2013); DRC and Justice Studio (2015); Dias (2011); Hamming (2011); 
Hartkorn (2011); World Bank (2009, 2010). 
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largely based on the assumed beneficial impact that participation – in planning, selecting and 
implementing public goods – can have on community trust in public institutions and their own 
role and responsibilities in these activities (Casey 2018; Mansuri and Rao 2004; Parker and 
Serrano 2000; White et al. 2018; Wong and Guggenheim 2018).10  
 
With CDD programmes, it is common to require communities to contribute in cash or through 
labour in order to receive external support (Dongier et al. 2002; Rawlings et al. 2004; Tendler 
2000; Vajja and White 2008; White et al. 2018; Wong 2012). Under this model, development 
aid is made contingent on informal contributions, with matching or block grants used to either 
incentivise or build on local collective action and capacity to mobilise revenue.11 As with 
CDD, co-financing requirements are often justified based on the belief that participation will 
create a greater sense of ownership over projects (Aga et al. 2018; Carvalho and White 
2004; Rawlings et al. 2004), with the potential to spur accountability and empower 
marginalised populations (Mathie and Cunningham 2003; Peters 2014; Ranganathan 
2014).12 The expectation of greater accountability parallels the expectation that taxation will 
lead to greater accountability. The logic is that when citizens are forced to pay taxes they are 
more likely to make demands on leaders in return for tax payment; leaders that are 
dependent on citizens for fiscal resources are more likely to be responsive to citizen 
demands (see e.g. Moore 2004; Prichard 2015).13 Aside from these hopes for greater 
accountability, requirements for community contributions are in line with neoliberal logic that 
prioritises the cost-effectiveness of projects and the notional fairness of cost-sharing (see 
e.g. Boesten et al. 2011; Meagher et al. 2014; Peters 2014).14 Though empirical evidence is 
limited, a World Bank guide to CDD notes that ‘Mandatory [community] contributions have 
been shown to be important in building community ownership, helping to ensure that cost- 
and service-level choices are not distorted by external grants, and ascertaining through 
willingness to pay that services respond to real demand – all of which contribute to greater 
sustainability’ (Dongier et al. 2002: 319). 
 
In Somalia, many CDD programmes, including the DRC’s DIALOGUE programme – the 
focus of this study – include requirements for community contributions. As with previous CDD 
programmes led by the DRC (Hamming 2011), and in line with the logic outlined above, the 
DIALOGUE matching grant programme was based on the idea that paying for services would 
make people more likely to monitor outcomes – leading to better public goods outcomes, 
greater accountability of local revenues and greater responsiveness of local leaders.15 While 
 
10  CDD is often seen as valuable in and of itself as a means to empower recipient communities, and is thought to improve 
development outcomes by promoting local ownership and civic participation, leading to more sustainable projects 
(Casey 2018; Mansuri and Rao 2004; Wong and Guggenheim 2018). International actors often view CDD as a means of 
building social capital and cohesion (see e.g. Fearon et al. 2009; Kim et al. 2020; Vajja and White 2008; Van Domelen 
2003). 
11  A matching grant refers to a grant where the amount of grant provided is related to the amount raised by communities. 
Block grants, meanwhile, refer to grants of a predetermined amount, known in advance to communities.  
12  A similar assumption is made when development aid is made contingent on evidence of local government revenue-
raising (see e.g. Catterson and Lindahl, 1998; Fjeldstad, 2001; Juul, 2006). 
13  For an exploration of this logic in the context of Somaliland, see e.g. Eubank (2012). 
14  The idea that community contributions can be efficient in revenue terms is based in part on some evidence that 
requiring community members to pay can improve targeting of public services, improve the sustainability of public 
goods, and supplement the budgets of governments or donors, thus increasing the number of projects that may be 
implemented (Jimenez and Paqueo 1996; Kleemeier 2000). For example, Dongier et al. (2002: 318) note that ‘One of 
the key challenges for scaling up CDD is to stretch public financial resources over a greater number of communities and 
subprojects. This can be achieved by supplementing public financing with local and private finance sources, promoting 
market delivery of private goods, and retaining matching grants only for those goods and services that communities and 
the market will not sufficiently finance. Private and community financing can be mobilized in three ways: through 
community contributions, credit financing of community contributions, and private commercial investment’. 
15  An evaluation of a previous DRC CDD programme found that the effort made by communities to raise contributions 
toward community projects was ‘the greatest catalyst for change and the focal point around which much community 
collaboration must occur’ (DRC 2014). Meanwhile, the theory of change of the DIALOGUE programme includes that, 
‘People that are willing to provide financial resources for a development project are more likely to demand accountability 
than people that are not willing to provide financial resources’ (DRC and Shaqodoon 2017).  
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community contributions have been widely incorporated into CDD programmes, however, 
little remains known about the impact of co-financing mechanisms, particularly where they 
involve informal contributions by community members (Tendler 2000).  
 
First, little is known about whether collective action and community contributions can be 
incentivised. While there is an extensive literature on the impacts of CDD,16 there is 
uncertainty as to whether CDD programmes are effective at incentivising collective action. 
While CDD programmes are often designed with the goal of building social capital, some 
evidence suggests that such programmes build on, rather than incentivise, collective action 
(Isham and Kähkönen 2002; Vajja and White 2008). Specifically, there is mixed evidence of 
the effect of CDD grants on informal contributions,17 while there is limited evidence of the 
impacts of matching grants, rather than block grants,18 and, to the best of our knowledge, no 
evidence that tracks actual informal contributions, as opposed to contributions estimated 
through behavioural games (e.g. Fearon et al. 2009). At the same time, there is limited 
evidence about the effects of incentivising contributions that are not strictly voluntary, as in 
the case of informal revenue generation.19  
 
Second, though it is often assumed that matching grant programmes requiring community 
contributions will lead to more positive public goods outcomes than external aid alone, there 
is little evidence of this outcome in practice.20 By contrast, abundant research points to the 
risk of elite capture of CDD programmes and community contributions, with local collective 
action shaped by pre-existing power and social relations (Carrick-Hagenbarth 2016; 
Ensminger 2017; Hedlund et al. 2013; Humphreys et al. 2012; Kumar and Corbridge 2002; 
McCarthy et al. 2016; Mosse 2005; Vajja and White 2008; Van Domelen 2003; White 1999). 
There is good reason to think that such distortions may be exacerbated by requirements for 
community financing, with local elites using coercive tactics to raise revenue that may be 
subsequently used to largely benefit elites, without broader input (e.g. Fjeldstad 2001). As 
described by White et al. (2018: 17) in a synthesis of evidence of the impact of CDD 
programmes, ‘The requirement for community contributions may engage a large proportion 
of the community, but their role is restricted to making cash, in-kind or labour contributions, 
and does not include decision-making’ (see also Vajja and White 2008; White 2002).21 At the 
same time, evidence suggests that requirements for local financing within CDD programmes 
 
16  For an overview see e.g. Mansuri and Rao 2004; Casey 2018; White et al. 2018; Wong 2012; Wong and Guggenheim 
2018. 
17  For example, in Sierra Leone, a CDD programme involving a block grant failed to ‘catalyze greater collective action or 
voluntary contributions to public goods in a sustainable fashion’ (Casey et al. 2011: 32), though Nguyen and Rieger 
(2017) show that a CDD programme in Morocco involving block grants can stimulate the willingness to contribute to 
public good. While not specific to CDD programmes, there is also a growing body of work exploring the effects of foreign 
aid on individuals’ willingness to contribute to public goods, though the evidence is likewise mixed (see e.g. Milner et al. 
2016; Montinola et al. 2020).  
18  An exception to this is a partner study to our research in Gedo region, which finds that a tiered matching grant 
programme in Somaliland incentivised collective action and local resource mobilisation (Bandula-Irwin 2021). 
19  There is considerable research on the effects of matching charitable contributions in high-income countries (see e.g. 
Baker et al. 2009; Eckel and Grossman 2003; Karlan and List 2021; Meier 2007; Rondeau and List 2008), with some 
limited exploration of the relationship between individual grants matched to voluntary contributions in low-income 
countries (e.g. Walker 2011). In contrast, there is limited understanding of the impact of matching grants in incentivising 
informal contributions in contexts where they are enforced through social mechanisms, as is common in many low-
income contexts (e.g. Olken and Singhal 2011; Paler et al. 2017; van den Boogaard et al. 2019), including in south-
central Somalia (see van den Boogaard and Santoro 2021). 
20  An exception to this is Brett (2003) who, in a review of studies on CDD, finds that financial contributions by beneficiaries 
at the implementation stage of projects positively influenced overall project success and sustainability.  
21  Reviewing the research of Vajja and White (2008) in Malawi and Zambia, White et al. (2018: 17) illustratively describe 
that ‘People participated in making bricks, not decisions’. White (2002) further notes that even where community 
contributions are widespread, some groups, like women and children, may be excluded entirely from decisions about 
project spending or project management. Similarly, in the context of a matching grant programme to incentivise local 
government revenue-raising in Tanzania, Fjeldstad (2001: 302) notes that donors’ presence ‘may induce increased tax 
effort’, but that this comes ‘at the expense of accountability and democratic consolidation’. Meanwhile, Juul (2006: 836) 
notes that donors’ assumption that co-financing ‘should motivate the population to contribute to their own development 
obviously does not hold true’ in contexts where accountability channels are limited. 
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can shape project selection in a way that is not necessarily aligned with citizen preferences.22 
Further, there is little understanding of the causal mechanisms linking community 
contributions and public goods outcomes. As noted, it is often assumed that contributing to 
local projects will make citizens more invested in positive outcomes, though there are 
growing reasons to be sceptical about the ways in which links between tax and accountability 
play out in low-income contexts (e.g. Bak 2019; Gadenne 2017; Martin 2016; van den 
Boogaard et al. 2020), while these links are underexplored in the context of informal taxation. 
Overall, there is little understanding of the ways in which external grants may transform or 
distort the accountability relationships between local leaders and taxpayers, if at all.  
 
Third, where community contributions are required, it is unclear whether they serve to crowd 
out other forms of informal and formal revenue generation. With regard to informal taxes, it is 
intuitive to think that households may have a budget for informal community contributions. If 
this is the case, aid delivery modalities requiring informal contributions may simply shift 
revenue away from other forms of informal revenue generation. To the best of our 
knowledge, the potential crowding-out effects on other forms of informal revenue generation 
have not been explored – though these outcomes have significant implications, given the 
importance of informal tax institutions to the financing of local public goods and informal 
social welfare institutions in many contexts. Do requirements for community contributions 
shift revenue away from particular types of public goods in favour of those prioritised by CDD 
programmes? When considering the impact on formal taxes, meanwhile, there are two 
possibilities: on the one hand, formal and informal taxes and taxing institutions may be seen 
as substitutes, with taxpayers viewing informal tax as negating their duty to pay formal taxes. 
This may be because they believe they have already contributed their fair share to public 
goods provision, or because they have greater trust in the accountability of informal taxing 
institutions relative to an ineffectual or corrupt government.23 On the other hand, informal 
taxes may serve as an alternative to a largely absent formal state without representing a 
rejection of that state, or may serve to ‘fund different types of public goods’ that the 
government is not able or eager to fund (Olken and Singhal 2011: 25), implying that informal 
tax payment may have no effect on formal taxes.24  
 
Finally – and related to questions about whether informal taxes limit formal tax capacity – 
where development partners work directly with communities to finance public goods outside 
the state, there remain important questions about the impact on state legitimacy. Indeed, 
there is limited understanding of the ways in which informal taxes affect perceptions of the 
state, its capacity and its governing authority. Again, two possibilities emerge, reflecting the 
ways that co-financing modalities may support either a virtuous or adverse cycle of 
governance (Blair and Winters 2020; Sacks 2012; Schmelzle and Stollenwerk 2018). On the 
one hand, the necessity of self-financing public goods may lead citizens to question the 
legitimacy of the state and reduce their willingness to engage with it – in turn, making it more 
difficult for the state to raise revenue and provide public goods in the future (see Levi 
1988).25 This view is in line with some perspectives, particularly from policy actors, about the 
risks of supporting service provision outside the state,26 and may be particularly likely in 
 
22  Rawlings et al. (2004) show that local financing requirements can force communities to select projects for which it will it 
be easier to generate in-kind or labour contributions rather than projects that would require cash, or to select projects 
that are less expensive to build. 
23  As proposed by Olken and Singhal (2011: 25), ‘If local governments are corrupt, residents may prefer to make 
payments toward public projects in a form that cannot be expropriated’.  
24  In other words, informal taxes may be an outcome of weak state taxing capacity, rather than a factor limiting state tax 
capacity. These possibilities may coexist and may reinforce each other. 
25  From this perspective informal institutions and political orders are seen as ‘rivals to the state and serve as active 
impediments to the expansion of state authority’ (Menkhaus 2014b: 148). 
26  For example, the OECD (2011: 83) cautions that service provision through non-state actors ‘can undermine 
strengthening of government systems’, with reliance on non-state actors a potential risk to statebuilding activities. Other 
observers have pointed to the risk of non-state service provision for state autonomy and power (see e.g. Matthews 
1997; Obiyan 2005), based on concerns that citizens would start to rely on non-state actors to provide basic services 
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contexts where state and non-state service provision are clear substitutes.27 On the other 
hand, if co-financing through informal taxation and service delivery outside the state 
improves public goods outcomes, taxpayer perceptions of government performance may 
likewise improve, increasing their willingness to cooperate with the state and accept its 
authority. Thus, co-financing outside the state may counterintuitively support a virtuous cycle 
of governance, helping weak states to emerge out of ‘low-tax, low-capacity’ traps. Recent 
research shows that informal taxation can strengthen, rather than undermine state 
institutions (van den Boogaard 2020b), while our previous research in Gedo region shows 
that informal taxes are positively correlated with the legitimacy of the local state and 
willingness to accepts its authority (van den Boogaard and Santoro 2021). This is in line with 
a more nuanced view of the relationship between formal and informal institutions (see e.g. 
Helmke and Levitsky 2004),28 as well as with a growing body of evidence that local collective 
action and non-state service provision can complement or supplement the state (see e.g. 
Cammett and MacLean 2014; Sacks 2012), and improve citizen perceptions of the state (e.g. 
Dietrich et al. 2018; Dietrich and Winters 2015). More broadly, this view is in line with 
research showing the ways in which state and traditional leaders or local elites may be 
complementary (e.g. Balán et al. 2020; Baldwin 2015, 2019).  
 
Building on these four knowledge gaps we ask: 
 
1. Can matching grants be used to incentivise informal contributions to public 
goods provision? 
2. Can co-financing through informal taxation improve public goods outcomes? 
If so, through what mechanisms? 
3. Do requirements for informal tax contributions within CDD programmes 
crowd out other forms of formal and informal revenue generation? 
4. Does co-financing of public goods provision through informal taxation 
undermine the legitimacy of the state? 
We shed light on these questions in the context of south-central Somalia, where formal state 
institutions are weak, informal taxing institutions are relatively prevalent and well-established, 
and there is little evidence of the impact of CDD and matching grant programmes, despite 
their widespread use by international development partners. 
 
 
3  Research design 
 
We explore the effects of a community-level intervention incentivising informal revenue 
generation through matching grants in three districts of Gedo region in Jubbaland state in 
 
rather than demanding services from their own governments (Edwards and Hulme 1996; Holzner 2010: 243; Moss et al. 
2006; OECD 2008b: 7) and empirical evidence that governments redirect spending to other activities when they are 
financed through alternative means (Torpey-Saboe 2015). This belief in the substitution of non-state and state service 
provision is so commonplace among some policy actors that there have been cases of governments asking foreign 
actors to stop providing public goods because they felt that their legitimacy was undermined by the non-state actors’ 
visible role in providing those goods (Ciorciari and Krasner 2018). 
27  For example, Bodea and Le Bas (2016: 215) show that ‘[w]here individuals have access to community-provided goods, 
which may substitute for effective state services provision, they are less likely to adopt pro-compliance norms’ towards 
the state.Similarly, Ali et al. (2014) find that frequent protection payments to non-state actors reduces the likelihood of 
having a tax-compliant attitude. Meanwhile, Acemoglu et al. (2020) find that greater trust in public goods provided by the 
state has a negative impact on citizens’ beliefs about non-state actors, and their willingness to engage in non-state 
public goods. 
28  In line with this view, research shows the ways in which informal institutions can cooperate or coexist with formal ones 
(e.g. Hart 2005; Meagher 1990, 2005; Roitman 1990, 2005), with the potential to sustain, reinforce, or remake state 




south-central Somalia.29 Matching grants were given through the DIALOGUE (Develop 
Informed and Accountable Local Governance through User Empowerment) programme of 
the Danish Refugee Council (DRC). DIALOGUE was undertaken in partnership with 
Shaqodoon, a Somali NGO, and built on the DRC’s previous CDD programmes in the region 
(see e.g. Armstrong 2014; Bryld and Kamau 2013; DRC and Justice Studio 2015; Dias 
2011).  
 
To be eligible to participate in the DIALOGUE programme, communities in Gedo region had 
to first identify a public works project to be jointly funded by communities and the DRC, and 
then to have community leaders submit a community development project proposal to the 
DRC.30 Community contributions within this study are in line with the most commonly-cited 
definition of informal tax, capturing contributions to the collective construction of community 
works projects (Olken and Singhal 2011: 5; see also Walker 2017). Proposals had to pass 
two criteria set by the DRC: first, the community – made up of a single settlement or a group 
of settlements that chose to work together for the purposes of the CDD programme – had to 
be sufficiently accessible for DRC field staff to visit, with some communities excluded 
because of security concerns; and, second, the public works or community development 
project had to, as determined by DRC field staff, benefit and be accepted by the community 
at large.31 Of the 62 communities that the DRC determined to be eligible, 31 communities 
were randomly selected through a public lottery at district level to receive the treatment 
intervention. Among these communities, we randomly selected 121 sub-community 
settlements for data collection, with the distribution weighted according to district population. 
Additionally, the DRC purposively selected seven larger-scale district-level projects for 
participation upon meeting the baseline eligibility requirements. Of these, only three were 
included in the study (Dooloow, Luuq and Beled Xaawo) on account of security constraints 
preventing travel to the other districts.  
The treatment involved two components. First, treatment communities received a grant that 
matched or surpassed revenue raised by communities through informal taxation for a specific 
community development project, proportional to the amount raised and to the level of inter-
clan collaboration.32 The matching grants were financed by the DRC but ‘co-managed’ with 
the state government, with funds channelled to community leaders through the Jubbaland 
State Ministry of Interior. All public communications about the project included the logo of the 
Jubbaland State Ministry of Interior rather than the DRC (Appendix A). Projects funded at the 
community level ranged from a total of US$2,630 to US$26,800 (an average of US$11,104), 
with communities contributing a total of US$112,966, matched by the DRC with US$197,935 
- with more in matching grants given the graduated rate of matching grants (Appendix B).33 
Meanwhile, the seven larger district-level projects ranged from US$50,001 to US$106,480 
(an average of US$64, 6579), with US$90,531 raised informally, matched with US$362,065.  
 
29  The three districts are Luuq, Beled Xaawo and Dooloow.  
30  Community leaders refers to clan elders, leaders of village councils and/or leaders of village development committees. 
31  We define settlement in line with the UNFPA’s (2014: 118), as ‘A group of dwellings comprising different households in 
a delineated area with clear boundaries’.  
32  Community fundraising took place over a 4-month period between June and November 2018, after which matching 
grants were distributed. The matching contributions were US$1 for each dollar raised by a settlement for a small project 
at the settlement level; US$2 for each dollar raised by several settlements for a multi-settlement project; US$3 for each 
dollar raised by different local clans for an inter-clan project that benefitted many communities; and US$4 for each dollar 
raised by district authorities for a district-level project. This incentive scheme was intended to foster inter-settlement and 
inter-clan collaboration. Of the communities that received a grant, 37% included multiple settlements and 23% included 
multiple clans. 
33  While the focus of informal revenue-raising was local communities, a small number of individuals in the diaspora 
contributed to local projects. Members of the diaspora contributed in only 3 treatment communities, though these 
contributions were relatively substantial (US$10,000 for a district-level project and US$2,000 each for 2 community-level 
projects). In these cases, diaspora communities raised funds and sent money to a representative in the community, who 




A secondary arm of the treatment involved a set of measures aimed to increase oversight 
over the communities’ management of the funds raised through informal taxation and 
matching grants. In treatment communities, the DRC and Shaqodooon oversaw the 
establishment of Community Project Implementation Units, which were charged with 
collecting contributions, managing project implementation, and setting up bank accounts in 
which treatment communities received the matching grants and community contributions 
(through in-person or mobile banking services). Matching grants and community 
contributions were tracked through a publicly accessible online crowdfunding platform and 
app called Sokaab, which includes an online summary of the revenue contributed by 
communities (disaggregated by transaction, though anonymised), and expenditure 
information for the projects (e.g. payments made to construction companies).34 After the 
public lottery, Shaqodoon ran community training meetings in treatment communities on 
crowdfunding and how to send money to community bank accounts through mobile money. 
Control communities, meanwhile, did not receive this treatment package, and we are 
confident that treatment and control communities are comparable across other key indicators 
(see Appendix C).  
 
Beyond the validity of the comparison, there at least three reasons why treatment and control 
communities differ from other communities in the region. First, as our study only includes 
communities that opted into the DIALOGUE programme and submitted proposals for 
community development projects, it is plausible that participating communities may have a 
stronger ability to mobilise informal revenue than communities that did not opt in. While our 
previous experience studying informal taxation and revenue generation in south-central 
Somalia gives us confidence that the mobilisation of informal taxes is common in the region, 
the degree and ease of informal revenue generation, as well as perceptions of and 
willingness to work with the state, may differ based on clan composition, security and extent 
of social cohesion – all of which vary considerably across south-central Somalia. Second, in 
order to be eligible for consideration in the DRC programme, settlements had to be safe 
enough to allow DRC field staff to visit, and thus may not be comparable to less safe ones.35 
Third, though the population of internally displaced persons (IDPs) in Gedo region is 
relatively high (estimated in 2014 to be 15 per cent, relative to 9 per cent across the country) 
(UNFPA 2014), our sample excludes IDP camps. More generally, Gedo region may 
represent a relatively unique context, potentially limiting the external validity of our findings. 
As compared with other regions in south-central Somalia, the relative security and 
homogeneity of communities in Gedo region may limit the replicability of our findings in less 
secure or homogeneous areas.36 At the same time, Gedo region has a uniquely strained 
relationship with the Jubbaland state administration, with potential implications for individuals’ 
 
34  The crowdfunding platform can be viewed at www.sokaab.com. To view an example of one of the projects funded 
through the DIALOGUE programme, see https://www.sokaab.com/home/view_project?id=28. 
35  Even after Jubbaland was incorporated into the Federal Government of Somalia in 2013, al-Shabaab has continued to 
exercise control in large parts of the rural areas of the state and in most of the rural areas and roads between districts in 
Gedo region, as well as territory in the south-east of the district (Hagmann 2016; Hiraal Institute 2020; UN Habitat 2018: 
5-6). Due to budget and security constraints, we could not survey communities that did not participate in the selection 
process at all, were not aware of the programme, and did not propose a community development project as part of the 
programme. While our findings may thus be limited to safer regions, insecurity is a relatively fluid concept in the region, 
illustrated by the relative unpredictability of the location and frequency of conflict events across districts in the region 
(Appendix E). 
36  The Marehan clan dominates in the region (Menkhaus 2006; UN Habitat,2018). Though this domination is at the 
expense of the Rahanweyn and other minority groups, the region represents a considerable degree of social 
homogeneity that may facilitate informal tax mobilisation. Indeed, multiple studies find that greater homogeneity within a 
community leads to greater social capital and cohesion, in turn either making individuals more likely to contribute to 
public goods (Akramov and Asante 2008; Fehr and Gächter 2000; Miguel and Gugerty 2005), or making management 
of public goods provision more efficient (Sun et al. 2010). Meanwhile, despite the continued presence of al-Shabaab, 
Gedo is perceived to be safer than other regions in Jubbaland state on account of political and economic power being 
centralised in the hands of an important clan, the Marehan (Menkhaus 2006: 84), having a more homogenous 
population, and having a significant Ethiopian military presence (UN Habitat 2018: 22).  
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willingness to engage with the programme.37 We reflect further on the limits to external 
validity in Section 6. 
 
 
4  Data 
 
Our primary data comes from two original panel surveys with households and community 
leaders in treatment and control communities in March 2018 and February 2019 (Appendix 
A).38 First, household surveys were conducted with 1,073 randomly selected households at 
baseline, of which 880 were successfully reached at endline,39 capturing formal and informal 
tax incidence, usage of public goods, perceptions of state and non-state actors and taxation, 
and civic and political participation. Second, we collected community-level data through 
surveys with 117 community leaders at baseline across treatment and control communities, 
of which 107 leaders were reached at endline. These surveys capture community-level data 
on public services, self-help activities, political and civic decision-making, community groups 
and civic participation, the nature of formal and informal taxation, security, and information 
about community development projects. 
 
There are at least three potential limitations to this survey data. First, while it was relatively 
easy to track village leaders one year later at endline, challenges arose when following up 
with individuals. Of the 880 surveyed at endline, only about half (391) could be 
unambiguously linked to baseline. The remaining half could not be traced back to baseline 
due to identification challenges in the field and a glitch in the survey form. We deal with this 
issue more specifically in the next section. Second, individuals may underreport the extent of 
informal tax payments where such payments are illegal. We do not believe this is a concern 
in Somalia, where many of the forms of informal revenue generation explored are normalised 
and highly institutionalised.40 Third, there is a risk that reported informal contributions are 
overestimated if survey respondents believe that demonstrating effective mobilisation of 
community resources would influence the likelihood of communities receiving future financial 
support from the DRC.41 We test for this type of bias and find evidence that community 
leaders in control communities may be inclined to frame their answers in a way that appeals 
to NGOs in order to receive matching grants (or other aid modalities) in the future, though we 
 
37  The tension between Gedo region and the Jubbaland state administration is rooted in broader tensions within the 
federation, including a perceived lack of representation of clan groups (Musau 2013). The leaders of Jubbaland state 
and the FGS fundamentally disagree over how Somalia’s political system should allocate power, with more recent 
disputes triggered by the federal government’s refusal to recognise the Jubbaland elections of 2019 (ICG 2013, 2020: 
1CIT. In this broader conflict, Gedo region is seen to support the FGS, with this support rooted in President Mohamed 
Abdullahi Mohamed ‘Farmajo’s ties to Gedo’s dominant Marehan clan, as well as the fact that the Jubbaland state has 
concentrated his security forces and political capital in Lower Juba, far from Gedo region (ICG, 2020: 4; Mwangi 2016). 
In recent years, after data collection for this study, the federal government has asserted control over some districts in 
Gedo region, including Luuq, Doolow and Beled Hawo (ICG, 2020, pp. 4M C. 
38  Questionnaires were designed based on an exploratory qualitative study of informal taxation led by one of the authors in 
Jubbaland and Hirshabelle states, and can be found in the supplementary online appendix. 
39  This reflects an attrition rate of 18%. Attrition is not correlated with treatment assignment and was largely the result of 
security constraints, which meant that 3 communities in Luuq district could not be visited at endline (Appendix C). 
40  This is in line with Gallien (2021: 2), who notes that ‘the normalization of illegal activities directly influences the risks 
involved in information sharing’ (Meagher et al. 2014; van den Boogaard 2020b: 54-59). Indeed, despite being 
extralegal, they are not associated with illegality or immorality. This is not surprising given the nature of political order in 
Somalia, where informal activities are not necessarily ‘wrong’ any more than formal activities are necessarily ‘right’ - 
indeed, there is significant evidence that taxpayers are more likely to perceive formal taxes negatively than informal 
ones (van den Boogaard and Santoro 2021).  
 There may nevertheless be particular risks (both of underreporting and for the security of research participants) when 
asking about informal taxation by non-stated armed actors and terrorist groups. To protect respondents, we do not ask 
directly about informal taxation by non-state armed groups, focusing only on community-based taxation for public goods 
provision.  
41  While the matching grant programme was not affected by survey responses, respondents may have believed that the 
DRC would expand the matching grant programme in the region if it was effective in mobilising informal contributions.  
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find no such bias among other individuals.42 We thus interpret the amount of informal tax 
contributions reported by community leaders to potentially be overestimated, and rely more 
heavily on the amounts of contributions reported by individuals themselves.  
 
We further mitigate the risk that informal tax contributions or individual satisfaction with 
project outcomes are overestimated by relying on two additional sources of directly 
observable data to complement the survey data. First, enumerators collected directly 
observable data within targeted communities, capturing the quantity and quality of public 
services; indicators of local accountability, transparency and decision-making processes; 
and, at endline, the quality of the community development project that was undertaken 
throughout the research period. Second, we track community contributions and expenditure 
on development projects through the Sokaab platform, which tracked community 
contributions, matching grants and project expenditure. Sokaab data includes details on 
project implementation and outcomes, expected and actual project expenditure, and total 
and disaggregated contributions to the project.43  
 
5  Main results 
 
Building on the knowledge gaps identified in Section 2, we explore the effects of the 
matching grant programme on three sets of outcomes: informal contributions, project 
outcomes, and perceptions of state and non-state governance actors. The identification 
strategy is straightforward, as it relies on the fact that the study is a randomised controlled 
trial. We regress our outcomes on treatment dummies and additional controls, and estimate 
results through a linear probability model, according to the following OLS specification:44 
𝑌𝑖 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽𝑖𝐷𝑖𝑎𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑢𝑒𝑖 + 𝑋𝑖Γ + 𝜃𝑖𝑌0 +  𝜖𝑖   (1) 
Where the outcome Yi  is the ex-post outcome of respondent i, as measured at endline. The 
variable Dialoguei  indicates whether respondent i  is in a village assigned to DIALOGUE. 
Therefore, βi  stands for the causal estimate of impact of the DIALOGUE programme. The set 
 
42  We check for this type of desirability bias by randomising receipt of a survey question that would indicate if respondents 
were giving answers based on their understanding of what the DRC would want to hear. Respondents were randomly 
allocated to two groups that were asked two versions of a statement. The unbiased question is: ‘Do you agree or 
disagree that community representatives, such as individuals in a development project committee, should be assigned 
through community-based elections?’. The biased question included an introductory statement that was meant to test 
the presence of a social desirability bias in favour of NGOs. The question is: ‘Many NGOs in the region believe that 
elections are always the best way to choose community representatives, such as individuals in a development project 
committee. Do you agree or disagree with this view?’. In control communities, 85% of leaders strongly or somewhat 
agree with the biased statement, relative to 72% in treatment communities, indicating that community leaders may shift 
their responses in a way that they believe would be more desirable from an NGO perspective. We find no evidence that 
household respondents intentionally responded with answers that they perceived to be more desirable for an NGO. 
Indeed, we find roughly the same balance of agreement with the biased question. If a bias existed, we would have seen 
an increase in the ‘strongly/just agree’ answers to the question. We would also have noticed more support from 
respondents in treatment villages to the question. Instead, respondents’ answers were distributed in a similar way 
across treatment and control villages. The p-value of a chi-square test is 35%, showing no significant differences 
between DIALOGUE and control villages.  
43  In addition to this financial data, we relied on data made available by Shaqodoon and the DRC that provided more 
details about large contributions, including whether contributions were international remittances, contributed by an 
individual or by a group through one representative donor.  
44  For binary outcomes, the linear probability model (LPM) provides easier interpretations for the marginal effects on the 
probability of outcomes, compared to probit and logit. While the assumption of homoscedascity does not hold in an 
LPM, calculating robust standard errors does control for that (Angrist and Pischke 2009). Moreover, LPM does not 




of control variables Xi  includes respondent level background information.45 We run 
regressions both with and without controls. We also include the baseline outcome variable  
Yi 0  as a pre-treatment control measured at baseline, in an ANCOVA estimation. In this 
fashion, we reduce the variance of the error term and thus results gain in statistical power 
(McKenzie 2012).46 Baseline outcomes are available for 391 respondents, while baseline 
values are imputed for those respondents with missing values.47 In addition, we add village-
level fixed effects, in order to capture any time-invariant feature of the village that may be 
correlated with the outcome, as well as an indicator variable for district capitals (Dooloow, 
Luuq, Beled Xaawo) since they participated in larger-scale district-level projects (see section 
3). The error term 𝜖𝑖  is clustered at the taxpayer level and robust to heteroscedasticity. 
Finally, we consider differential attrition concerns. Attrition rate was not extremely high (18%) 
but relatively dependent on location. Due to security constraints, three communities in 
Dooloow could not be visited. This implied that respondents in this district are 
underrepresented at endline, while those in Beled Xaawo are over-represented. We 
therefore run all regressions by using sampling weights so as to over- and under-represent 
Dooloow and Beled Xaawo respondents, respectively. As a last attempt to address attrition, 
the background variables Xi  specified above also include some unbalanced features, which 
are then controlled for in the analysis. 
5.1 Effects on informal contributions to public goods 
 
We first explore the effects of the matching grant programme on informal contributions to 
new community development projects undertaken over the period of study. As reported in 
household surveys, we find that treatment communities are more likely than control 
communities to have undertaken a new development project in the previous year, and were 
able to raise more money in informal taxes in support of that community development 
project.48 As described in Table 1 (col. 2), we find an increase of 14 percentage points (p.p.) 
in the likelihood of having implemented a new project since baseline that can be attributed to 
the DIALOGUE programme. Apart from being statistically significant, this result is also 
substantial when compared to the control group mean of 37 per cent, translating into a 38 
per cent increase in the likelihood of having a new project in treated communities. Likewise, 
as described in Table 1 (col. 4), the value of extra contributions raised in treated communities 
represents more than 10 per cent of what was raised in control ones – 62 p.p. over a control 




45  Controls include gender, education level, clan, household size, occupation, district in which the respondent lives, 
whether the respondent lives in an urban or rural area, and baseline usage of mobile money. 
46  In the few cases in which the outcome variable is not available at baseline, we omit the lagged-outcome variable. 
47  Missing values are imputed to the baseline mean of those respondents with non-missing values. Also, an indicator 
variable is created to indicate those respondents for which the imputation took place. 
48  These positive effects are confirmed by the responses of community leaders. Survey data from community leaders 
show that treated communities were more likely to start a new project (96%) than control communities (88%). Though 
treatment communities are more likely to start a new project, it is still striking that the vast majority of control 
communities undertook a new development project without external financing. We attribute this to the fact that control 
communities had already developed a project proposal, so may have been more prepared to mobilise revenue for a new 




Table 1 DIALOGUE impact on new community development projects in last year49 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 
Any new project Any new project Log total 
contributions to new 
projects (US$) 
Log total 
contributions to new 
projects (US$) 
Dialogue 0.13** 0.14** 0.68** 0.62** 
 (0.06) (0.06) (0.28) (0.28) 
     
Controls  No Yes No Yes 
     
Village FE  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Control Y endline 0.37 0.37 6.60 6.60 
R-sq. 0.387 0.390 0.491 0.501 
Observations 880 880 1019 1019 
Standard errors in parentheses. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
These results are consistent with responses from community leaders. In line with the findings 
from the household survey, community leaders report that 37 per cent and 25 per cent of 
households contributed to the new projects in treatment and control communities, 
respectively. This indicates that the DIALOGUE programme increased contributions at the 
extensive margin. This is in line with the regression results reported in Appendix B Table B2, 
which show that the DIALOGUE programme significantly improved the extensive margin of 
contributions, both at the level of a new project being implemented (col. 1-2) and in terms of 
more households contributing (col 3-4). In terms of the contribution amounts by communities 
and households, or the intensive margins, as reported by community leaders, results indicate 
that total contributions are significantly increased by the matching grant programme 
(Appendix B Table B2, col. 4 and 5), while the average contributions increased, but not 
significantly. When we compare these results to the more objective data from the Sokaab 
contribution tracking platform, we find that leaders overestimate these numbers, though we 
have no reason to believe that overestimations are more skewed in either treatment or 
control communities.50 Overall, the impact evidence from community leaders is statistically 
significant, despite the small sample size, and confirms the positive impact in Table 1 using 
household survey data. 
We further explore whether incentives to raise informal community taxes made it more 
difficult to collect formal taxes or informal taxes and contributions outside of the DIALOGUE 
programme – that is, whether the matching grants had a crowding-out effect on either the 
state’s ability to levy formal taxes or on other informal forms of revenue generation upon 
which communities rely for local governance, conflict resolution, social protection and service 
provision (van den Boogaard and Santoro 2021). We observe no crowding-out effect of the 
DIALOGUE programme on other forms of revenue-raising; instead, we observe an increase 
in the number of informal taxes collected in treatment communities, with positive impacts on 
informal taxes paid to religious leaders, clan leaders and to support public goods (Table 2). 
Positive spillover effects are particularly meaningful for religious contributions, which almost 
double in treated communities – with a 17 p.p. increase over a control group mean of 0.21 
(col. 4). Contributions to clan elders also significantly increase in number, by about half of the 
control group mean (col. 6). Other informal contributions for public goods provision outside of 
the DIALOGUE programme also increase, though this increase is weakly significant (col. 8). 
An anomaly in this pattern arises, however, with respect to informal contributions to village 
leaders, which do not change as a result of the matching grant programme (col. 2). The 
 
49  For columns 1 and 2, the survey question is: ‘Is there any new (since last year) development projects/community 
improvements in the village that you used at least once?’. For columns 3 and 4, the survey question is: ‘Please indicate 
how much US$s do you think were raised in total for the project’. 
50  In treatment communities, we cross-reference self-reported data with the contributions data from the Sokaab platform, 
finding that community leaders overestimate the amount of household and total contributions. Community leaders in 
treatment communities estimate overall contributions at an average of US$6,945, contrasted by an average of 
US$5,310 reported on the Sokaab platform. Likewise, community leaders reported that average household contributions 
were US$167, higher than the average of 80 contributions of US$47 per project reported on the Sokaab platform.  
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peculiarity of the impacts of the DIALOGUE programme on village leaders is a pattern in our 
findings that is explored in greater detail below. Meanwhile, impacts on formal taxes are null 
and insignificant, with a very low control group mean (13%) (Table 2).51 
Table 2 DIALOGUE impact on IRG (sub-categories) 











Dialogue -0.01 -0.00 0.17*** 0.17*** 0.44*** 0.44*** 0.18* 0.16* 
 (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.14) (0.14) (0.11) (0.11) 
         
Baseline 
outcome  
No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes 
         
Controls  No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes 
         
Village FE  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Control Y endline 0.17 0.17 0.21 0.21 0.97 0.97 0.55 0.55 
R-sq. 0.259 0.263 0.389 0.398 0.353 0.364 0.396 0.403 
Observations 880 880 880 880 880 880 880 880 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. The outcome is the raw total of informal contributions 
for a particular category. Village leader contributions: labour contributions to village leader, conflict resolution fees. Religious 
fees: Zakat. Clan-based contributions: Diyya, clan debt relief, Qaaran. Public goods contributions: town cleaning, communal 
labour, support to teachers and schools, CDPs, social payments, group labour to fix a roof. 
 
5.2 Effects on project outcomes 
 
We then explore the effects of the DIALOGUE programme on the nature and quality of 
project outcomes. First, we explore the types of project undertaken through the matching 
grant programme, building on research that suggests that requirements for community 
contributions can shape project selection (Rawlings et al. 2004). We find that treatment 
communities were more likely to build primary schools and meeting halls when compared to 
control communities (Appendix F Figure F1) – the choice of which project only partly reflects 
individual preferences at baseline (Appendix F Figure F2). On the one hand, it is positive to 
see that primary schools were the primary preference of respondents at baseline, and are 
correspondingly the most common project implemented across treatment and control 
communities. On the other hand, there are some discrepancies between individual 
preferences and implemented projects, with, for example, communal water sources and 
health posts being undertaken at a lower frequency than would be predicted by reported 
preferences. Likewise, meeting and social halls are rarely desired by households at baseline, 
and yet they are implemented much more frequently than expected – and more frequently in 
treatment communities.  
 
Second, we find positive effects on the quality of project outcomes. Individuals in treatment 
communities were less likely to be dissatisfied with new public goods relative to individuals in 
control communities (Table 3). Using a 1-5 dissatisfaction index, where 5 indicates maximum 
dissatisfaction, we find that the index falls by 45 p.p. in treated communities, or about 10 per 
cent of the control group mean (col. 2). This finding is in line with the more objective 
assessment of project quality recorded by enumerators at endline, according to which new 
projects in treatment communities appear to be of a higher quality than those in control 
communities (Appendix F, Figure F3).52 Perhaps correspondingly, we find that individuals in 
treatment communities are significantly more likely to expect to receive something in return 
for informal contributions (Table 3). As shown in column 4, the likelihood of individuals 
 
51  Table omitted for brevity and available from the authors upon request. 
52  As described in Appendix F Table F1, the DIALOGUE programme’s impact on whether the project was actually 
completed at endline is not significant (albeit of a positive coefficient). This could relate to the short time span (1 year 
after baseline) after which the endline survey was conducted. 
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perceiving that they get something in return for informal contributions increases by 19 p.p. in 
treatment communities, which is about a third of the control group mean at endline. 
Table 3 Dissatisfaction with new community development projects 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 









getting something in 
return for informal 
contributions 
Perceptions of 
getting something in 
return for informal 
contributions 
Dialogue -0.43*** -0.45*** 0.20** 0.19** 
 (0.12) (0.12) (0.09) (0.10) 
     
Baseline outcome - - No Yes 
Controls  No Yes No Yes 
     
Village FE  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Control Y end-line 4.16 4.16 0.66 0.66 
Control Y baseline - - 0.22 0.22 
R-sq 0.372 0.375 0.451 0.471 
Observations 998 998 570 570 
Standard errors in parentheses. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
We consider two non-mutually exclusive mechanisms through which these positive public 
goods outcomes may emerge, both relating to channels of accountability. First, the matching 
grant programme may increase citizens’ capacity or perceptions of their right to demand 
answers of leaders – what we call, borrowing a term from Schedler (1999), a bottom-up 
‘answerability’ mechanism. For instance, it may be the case that the presence of an external 
partner led individuals to believe that their demands would be more likely to be listened to, 
that individuals had a greater incentive to monitor projects because of the higher value of 
projects in treatment communities as a result of the matching grants, or that the role of an 
external actor implies higher risks for communities in the case of aid mismanagement, with 
the potential to threaten future donor relationships. To test this answerability hypothesis, we 
explore the impact of the DIALOGUE programme on four indicators of community 
participation and demand-making by citizens. As described in Table 4, we find that the 
DIALOGUE programme had consistent and significant positive effects on the likelihood of 
individuals attending meetings (col. 2), playing a role in monitoring community projects (col. 
4), asking leaders about public revenue (col. 6), and raising issues with other community 
members (col. 8). Coefficients are all precisely estimated and represent an increase ranging 
from a fifth (for monitoring) to a quarter (asking about revenue) of the control group mean. 
Table 4 DIALOGUE impact on respondents' ‘answerability’ actions 






















Dialogue 0.13*** 0.14*** 0.11** 0.11** 0.18*** 0.18*** 0.16*** 0.16*** 
 (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) 
         
Baseline 
outcome  
No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes 
         
Controls  No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes 
         
Village FE  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Control Y 
endline 
0.84 0.84 0.83 0.83 0.80 0.80 0.83 0.83 
Control Y 
baseline 
0.26 0.26 0.09 0.09 0.16 0.16 0.16 0.16 
R-sq. 0.406 0.415 0.432 0.441 0.417 0.426 0.426 0.443 
Obs. 880 880 880 880 880 880 880 880 
Standard errors in parentheses. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
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Second, we consider a top-down transparency mechanism, based on longstanding ideas that 
transparency generates accountability, based on the conventional wisdom that ‘sunshine is 
said to be the best disinfectant, electric light the best policeman’ (Louis Brandeis cited in Fox 
2007: 664).53 From this view, external constraints that make information more transparent 
force leaders to better manage project outcomes, increasing their responsiveness to 
taxpayers. This is plausible in the context of the DIALOGUE programme given the role of 
NGOs in introducing transparency requirements, which may have created external pressure 
on leaders to be more transparent and to better manage resources. The programme required 
contributions to be tracked through an online transparency platform (Sokaab) that could, at 
least in theory, be monitored by community members, NGO staff and government officials. 
Overall, however, we find mixed evidence of more transparent and inclusive decision-making 
in treatment communities as a result of the DIALOGUE programme. As described in Table 5, 
respondents in treatment communities were more likely to report that a distinct committee 
had been set up to manage the project, the likelihood of which increases by a substantial 60 
per cent of the control group mean (col. 2); that they had been consulted in person about the 
project, a 50 per cent increase in the likelihood of that happening in treated communities 
compared to control communities (col. 4); and, with weak significance, that the project had 
been decided through a community meeting, representing an increase of a third of the 
control group average (col. 6).54 At the same time, however, individuals in treatment 
communities reported less frequent information sharing and meetings about the project 
(Table 6). Both outcomes show a statistically significant reduction when compared to the 
control group.  
Table 5 DIALOGUE impact on inclusive decision making55 















Dialogue 0.22*** 0.20*** 0.18*** 0.17*** 0.09 0.10* 
 (0.06) (0.06) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) 
       
Controls  No Yes No Yes No Yes 
       
Village FE  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Control Y 
endline 
0.33 0.33 0.38 0.38 0.35 0.35 
R-sq. 0.413 0.423 0.344 0.350 0.421 0.428 
Observations 957 957 1030 1030 1030 1030 
Standard errors in parentheses. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
  
 
53  A more nuanced theory of transparency and accountability based on empirical evidence recognises that transparency is 
‘necessary but far from sufficient to produce accountability’ (Fox 2007: 665). 
54  This last finding is in line with the fact that project choices in treatment communities were aligned, at least partially, with 
household baseline preferences (see Appendix F Figures F1, F2). 
55  In col. 1-2, the survey question is: ‘Was a distinct development planning committee set up specifically to help manage 
the project?’. In col. 3-4: ‘Were you consulted in person about the choice of the project?’. In col. 5-6: ‘How was the 
project chosen?’, and the outcome is a 0-1 variable for whether the project has been chosen with a community meeting 
where a consensus has been reached. 
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Table 6 DIALOGUE impact on frequency of information sharing about new project56 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 








Dialogue -0.45** -0.45** -0.73*** -0.77*** 
 (0.22) (0.22) (0.23) (0.23) 
     
Controls  No Yes No Yes 
     
Village FE  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Control Y endline 4.30 4.30 4.25 4.25 
R-sq. 0.392 0.397 0.373 0.382 
Observations 1030 1030 1030 1030 
Standard errors in parentheses. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
5.3 Effects on perceptions of governance actors 
 
Finally, we consider the effects of the matching grant programme on perceptions of state and 
non-state governance actors, exploring whether incentivising informal tax contributions 
through matching grants and delivering public goods outside state institutions supports or 
undermines citizen perceptions of the state and its legitimacy. Legitimacy reflects the 
willingness to accept the state’s authority (Baynes 2001; Levi et al. 2009; Levi and Sacks 
2009; Risse and Stollenwerk 2018), allowing governments to rely on citizens’ voluntary – or 
quasi-voluntary – compliance with state policies, with the effect of decreasing the costs of 
policy implementation and improving the efficiency of the provision of public goods. In this 
way, state legitimacy is deeply related to a state’s capacity ‘to get things done’ (Centeno et 
al. 2017: 13; see also Englebert 2002; Fukuyama 1995, 2013). The measurement of 
legitimacy, however, is challenging for at least three key reasons. Individuals may have 
different conceptual understandings of legitimacy (Beetham 1991: 13); behavioural indicators 
of compliance with the state may not necessarily correlate to beliefs of legitimacy, as 
individuals may comply with taxation out of fear or other rational reasons (Schaar 1984), 
while enforcement may be unrelated to citizen perceptions of the state; and observers may 
be unable to differentiate individuals’ support for the regime in power and acceptance of state 
institutions more broadly (Guerrero 2011).  
Tax morale – attitudes among taxpayers towards paying taxes – avoids some of the issues in 
measuring state legitimacy, as it better reflects taxpayer perceptions of the right of the state 
to govern rather than behavioural measures, and is removed from ideas of the regime in 
power. As our goal is to capture broad acceptance of government authority rather than 
perceptions of government performance or taxpayer behaviour, we use a measure of tax 
morale that captures an individual’s expressed attitude towards the right of an actor to levy 
taxes or fees,57 regardless of that actor’s behaviour (Prichard forthcoming).58 Thus using an 
 
56  In col. 1-2, the survey question is: ‘How often was information about the project shared with the community?’. In col. 3-4: 
‘How often was a community meeting held in the village to discuss the project and give updates to the villagers?’, and 
the outcome is a 1-7 index variable increasing with the frequency of information sharing and village meetings. 
57  While tax may be conceptualised differently in different contexts and languages, the piloting and translation exercises 
undertaken during fieldwork give us confidence that the measures of tax morale to different governance actors 
fundamentally relates to citizens’ willingness to assent to that actor’s authority. This is particularly the case as the survey 
question captured both an actor’s authority to levy taxes (canshuur) and informal contributions (yabooh dhaqaale la 
siiyo). Accordingly, tax morale is not limited to formal tax payments, and captures a wider range of possible payments. 
This is particularly important in the context of south-central Somalia, where formal tax collection is minimal in practice. 
Indeed, even though a small proportion of citizens paid any taxes to the local state at baseline (van den Boogaard and 
Santoro 2021), we are confident that our measure of tax morale captures citizens’ willingness to accept the authority of 
the local state, even in a context where they have little experience of paying taxes to the state. We are thus confident 
that we capture a reasonable measure of legitimacy that is comparable across governance actors that levy different 
types of payments. For more on the nature of these different types of payments, see van den Boogaard and Santoro 
(2021). 
58  Within the survey, respondents were asked: ‘Do you agree or disagree that [x actor] always has the right to make 
people pay taxes or make contributions?’ Our outcome takes value 1 if the respondent agrees or strongly agrees with 
the statement, and zero otherwise. 
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unconditional measure of tax morale, capturing the acceptance of an actor’s governing 
authority, we disentangle legitimacy from performance or trust.59 As we capture it, tax morale 
reflects a ‘citizen’s assent to tax both reflects and defines state-society relations’, with 
willingness to accept tax authority as ‘an ongoing and constant gauge of the legitimacy of the 
state in the eyes of citizens’ (D’Arcy 2011: 1). Where willingness to pay taxes to a given actor 
is high, we can infer that individuals accept the right of that actor to collect taxes and 
govern.60  
Using tax morale as a proxy for a given actor’s legitimacy, we find that the DIALOGUE 
programme had significant positive effects on the legitimacy of local state and non-state 
governance actors (Table 7). Perhaps most surprisingly, given that the local government 
played no direct role in the matching grant programme, perceptions of the legitimacy of the 
district government improved in treatment relative to control communities (col. 2), with belief 
in the district government’s right to make people pay taxes (tax morale) increased by about 
20 p.p. – or a third of the control group average. While we find similar positive increases in 
perceptions of the authority of clan elders (an increase of 28% of the control group mean, 
col. 6) and, an even stronger effect for religious leaders (an increase of 38% of the control 
group mean, col. 8), we see no such improvement for the (non-state) village council (col. 4). 
The latter finding is directly related to the poor spillover effects on contributions to village 
leaders as described in Table 2 above.  
Table 7 Impact on actor’s legitimacy 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 District District Village Village Clan Clan Religious Religious 
Dialogue 0.22*** 0.22*** 0.03 0.03 0.19*** 0.19*** 0.25*** 0.25*** 
 (0.07) (0.07) (0.05) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) 
         
Baseline 
outcome  
No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes 
         
Controls  No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes 
         
Village FE  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Control Y 
end-line 
0.67 0.67 0.77 0.77 0.68 0.68 0.66 0.66 
Control Y 
baseline 
0.45 0.45 0.65 0.65 0.66 0.66 0.61 0.61 
R-sq. 0.324 0.330 0.259 0.267 0.314 0.318 0.360 0.366 
Obs. 866 866 869 869 867 867 847 847 
Standard errors in parentheses. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
We explore four mechanisms through which these outcomes may be explained. First, for an 
engagement-based mechanism, we consider whether positive outcomes for state legitimacy 
and perceptions of the state are related to greater engagement with state officials. This is 
based on the idea that relationships formed at the point of service delivery affect citizens’ 
perceptions of the state (Bodea and LeBas 2016; Fisk and Cherney 2017; Karim 2020; see 
also Robinson 2008; Tsai 2011).61 While the DIALOGUE intervention appears to have led to 
an increase in the level of interaction with district officials and perceptions of the inclusivity of 
the district government in decision-making processes, the estimates are not significant at any 
 
59  This in line with Dreier and Lake (2019), who show that ‘Individuals from diverse demographic backgrounds imbue state 
institutions with the right to perform their governance and law-enforcement duties, even after experiencing institutional 
incompetence or injustice’. They show that individuals’ trust in state institutions breaks down following negative first-
hand experience, but that their faith in the institutions themselves does not change. 
60  Furthermore, as an indication of the state’s ability to garner quasi-voluntary tax compliance, an unconditional measure 
of tax morale may be indicative of future capacity to extract taxes - the most common measure of state capacity 
(Fukuyama 2013: 353; Lieberman 2002; Wang and Angang 2001).  
61  For example, Karim (2020: 536) argues that ‘relationships between state agents and citizens drive positive attitude 
formation, because these relationships provide information and facilitate social bonds’, with relationship building 
between state agents and citizens being ‘an important part of statebuilding’.  
 25 
 
level and therefore are inconclusive (Appendix G Table G1). In contrast, when we consider 
non-state governance actors, we observe significant increases in perceptions of the 
inclusivity of religious leaders and clan elders in treatment communities, in line with 
increases in the belief that these actors always have the right to collect tax (Appendix G 
Table G2). In line with the lack of impact that we find on village leaders’ legitimacy, citizen 
interactions with and perceptions of the inclusivity of these actors is not positively impacted 
by the DIALOGUE programme.62 
Second, we consider a performance-based mechanism, based on a body of literature that 
emphasises the link between effective delivery of goods and services and perceptions of the 
state (Braithwaite and Levi 1998; McLoughlin 2015; Sacks and Larizza 2012; Schmelzle and 
Stollenwerk 2018 and corresponding special issue; Weber 1962; Zartman 1995; Ziblatt 
2008). In line with this, and as shown in Appendix H, we find a positive relationship between 
the matching grant programme and perceptions of the transparency, trust and performance 
of the district government and religious leaders (Appendix H Tables H1 and H3). The impact 
on clan elders is inconclusive (Appendix H Table H4). Finally, in line with the pattern of 
perceptions of tax morale, trust in village leaders and perceptions of their transparency are 
not shaped by the DIALOGUE programme, while perceptions of their performance, relative to 
the previous year’s performance assessment, are actually negatively impacted by the 
programme (Appendix H Table H2).  
Third, we consider a false attribution mechanism, based on the idea that where positive 
public goods outcomes are delivered, it may be necessary for citizens to attribute outcomes 
to the state in order for the state to benefit (McLoughlin 2015; Sacks 2012; Schmelzle and 
Stollenwerk 2018; Stollenwerk 2018). As described by van den Boogaard (2020b: 282) it is 
possible that informal taxes ‘may positively contribute to state legitimacy by visibly improving 
the quality of public goods if citizens attribute those improvements to the state’. Accordingly, 
we further explore to whom individuals attributed the matching grant programme, which 
involved project development, implementation, and informal revenue generation by 
community leaders (including the village council or village development committee), external 
funding and monitoring by an NGO, and a role for the state government in distributing the 
matching grant funds. There is some indication that community leaders viewed the role of the 
local government as important. As described by a community leader in Beled Xaawo, the 
matching grant programme was ‘the first project of its kind in this area, where the district 
authority worked closely with the community leadership and representatives in delivering a 
project as truly collaborating partners’ (cited in SSF 2019). As described in   
 
62  Related to this engagement-based mechanism, we further tested for a clientelism mechanism, exploring whether being 
known personally by a particular governance actor impacted perceptions of that actor’s legitimacy. We find no evidence 
for this clientelism mechanism. 
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Figure 1, however, few individuals in treatment communities attributed any role of the 
programme to the government, instead highlighting the role of the NGO, the village council 
and the community development council.63 This indicates that increased positive perceptions 
of the state were not a result of the project being mistakenly directly attributed to it.  
  
 
63  While attribution is often assumed to be ambiguous and unclear (Cruz and Schneider 2017), Fjeldstad (2001) similarly 
finds that this isn’t always the case, with citizens in some contexts clearly distinguishing between government services 
and donor-provided services. 
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Figure 1 Perceptions of project leaders 
 
Finally, we test an informal contributions mechanism, considering how informal revenue 
generation interacts with the DIALOGUE programme to explain the impact on perceptions of 
legitimacy. Indeed, improvements in an actor’s legitimacy may be explained by increased 
informal contributions, spurred by the DIALOGUE programme (see Table 2 above). Table 8 
reports the estimate of a specification including the interaction term between an indicator 
variable for being in a treated village and an indicator for the respondent contributing more 
than the median in the sample at endline. If the increase in informal revenue generation, as 
attributed to the programme, is a mediator for the positive changes in actors’ legitimacy, we 
would expect the interaction term Dialogue*IRG to show a statistically significant coefficient 
in Table 8. However, that is not the case here, and results are inconclusive. The interaction 
term is never significant for any actor. The DIALOGUE programme alone (Dialogue variable 
in Table 8) retains the same positive impact on the legitimacy of district government, clan 
elders and religious leaders as shown in Table 7, while increased informal revenue 
generation is shown to not be the mechanism at play. Further, higher informal revenue 
generation alone (IRG variable in Table 8) is positively correlated with religious leaders’ 
legitimacy – a correlation which has already been identified in van den Boogaard and 
Santoro (2021). We can therefore conclude that increased contributions are not the channel 
through which the matching grant programme improves actors’ legitimacy. Some other 
mechanisms, which we are unable to explore further with the available data, must be at play. 




Table 8 DIALOGUE impact on actors’ legitimacy – interactions with IRG 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 District District Village Village Clan Clan Religious Religious 
Dialogue 0.23*** 0.23*** -0.00 -0.00 0.16** 0.16** 0.23*** 0.23*** 
 (0.07) (0.07) (0.06) (0.06) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) 
         
Dialogue*IRG -0.05 -0.03 0.09 0.09 0.06 0.06 -0.03 -0.02 
 (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.07) (0.07) 
         
IRG 0.01 0.01 -0.04 -0.05 0.03 0.03 0.12** 0.12** 
 (0.05) (0.05) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) 
         
Baseline outcome  No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes 
         
Controls  No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes 
         
Village FE  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Control Y endline 0.67 0.67 0.77 0.77 0.68 0.68 0.66 0.66 
Control Y baseline 0.45 0.45 0.65 0.65 0.66 0.66 0.61 0.61 
R-sq. 0.324 0.330 0.261 0.268 0.318 0.321 0.370 0.376 
Observations 866 866 869 869 867 867 847 847 
Standard errors in parentheses. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
 
6  Discussion: co-financing CDD through 
informal taxes 
 
Overall, we find that the DIALOGUE matching grant programme in Gedo region had a 
positive effect on key outcomes of interest, including with regard to the effectiveness of co-
financing CDD and the externalities that such an aid delivery modality can have on state and 
non-state governance actors. Our research contributes to the relatively limited evidence base 
in this area, and contrasts with concerns that co-financed CDD programmes can lead to elite 
capture or that operating outside formal institutional channels can undermine the state. We 
reflect in turn on these findings and how they emerged – highlighting in particular the strong 
foundation of informal taxation and governance in the region and the role of accountability 
channels spurred by the programme – and contemplate the limits to external validity of our 
findings.  
6.1 Effectiveness of co-financing CDD 
 
The effectiveness of a co-financing model of CDD depends on two key questions: did the 
programme incentivise local contributions, and did it lead to better public goods outcomes? 
First, we find that the matching grant programme had a positive effect on the capacity of 
communities to undertake development projects and to raise informal taxes to finance local 
public goods. Given the relatively high baseline of informal taxation and the 
institutionalisation of informal taxing institutions in Gedo region, this finding is in itself 
somewhat surprising. Indeed, while it is often assumed that grants that match contributions 
or voluntary donations will incentivise individuals to contribute, there is no evidence that 
these incentives would be as strong in a context where baseline informal revenue generation 
is already relatively high, and, importantly, where informal contributions are not strictly 
voluntary, but enforced through social and informal political mechanisms. As described 
above, control communities still raised considerable informal revenue to undertake 
development projects. Even in such a context, however, the matching grant programme 
served to significantly increase the likelihood of communities undertaking a new community 
development project, and increased the amount of informal taxes to support the project. Our 
evidence thus supports the notion that CDD programmes can effectively build on existing 
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social capital, while also providing evidence that they can incentivise further collective action 
even in cases with relatively high baseline contributions.64  
 
There is an open question, however, of the extent to which these would be replicable in less 
secure or homogeneous areas, with, as noted in Section 2, the degree and ease of informal 
revenue generation expected to differ based on clan family, degree of security and extent of 
social cohesion. More broadly, the context of south-central Somalia may be unique in terms 
of local revenue-raising capacity, given its long history of reliance on informal institutions and 
revenue, with informal taxing institutions prevalent, institutionalised and relatively well-trusted 
by citizens (van den Boogaard and Santoro 2021). Where a threshold of social capital does 
not exist, the ability of matching grants to incentivise contributions or build local collective 
action is uncertain, in part because the social conditions required for informal revenue 
generation and community mobilisation are likely to be shaped by long-run and deeply 
embedded structural factors, such as conflict, colonialism and state capacity (e.g. Bowles 
and Gintis 2004; Nunn 2008). Nevertheless, despite the reality that Somalia may be a 
relatively extreme case in terms of having strong enabling conditions for informal revenue 
generation, widespread evidence suggests that it is not an outlier, as ‘informal taxation is 
geographically isolated to a particular region of the world’ (Olken and Singhal 2011: 6).65 
Meanwhile, there is no established theory of conflict, social cohesion and informal revenue 
generation, further suggesting that informal revenue-raising capacity is not limited 
geographically.66  
Second, while the existing literature on CDD highlights the risk of elite capture of 
programmes – and while there is good reason to think that these risks may be particularly 
acute where local financing is required (see Fjeldstad 2001) – the matching grant programme 
had an overall positive impact on the quality of project outcomes.67 Overall, we find 
significant evidence that the matching grant programme improved individual satisfaction with 
project outcomes and perceptions of fiscal reciprocity. This is supported by enumerators’ 
observations that the quality of new projects in treatment communities was higher than those 
undertaken in control communities. Our findings indicate that the positive project outcomes 
associated with the matching grant programme may be the result of a combination of greater 
community participation and transparency requirements embedded within the programme. 
As a result of the programme, individuals appear to be more likely to perceive and exercise 
their right to demand accountability, contributing to greater answerability of local leaders.68 At 
the same time, transparency requirements seem to have led leaders to engage in more 
inclusive decision-making, though less frequent information-sharing about the project 
throughout the year. While we are uncertain of the reasons for this discrepancy in leaders’ 
 
64  Supporting this, an evaluation of the programme commissioned by the implementing NGO found that ‘one of the 
greatest impacts noted from interviews with community members is the sense of self-reliance’ (Smart Vision 2019: 30). 
As one youth leader in Luuq described, ‘This project has shown us that when community come together [sic], then we 
can do a lot to take care of our welfare. We trust that the school we have built … is just the first step of the ladder to 
what we can do through such projects’ (cited in Smart Vision 2019: 30). 
65  Indeed, informal taxation and revenue generation is documented in diverse contexts (Olken and Singhal 2011; van den 
Boogaard 2020b; Paler et al. 2017). 
66  On one hand, state weakness resulting from conflict may force communities to mobilise and self-finance essential goods 
and services. On the other, conflict-affected regions may be more divided and less cohesive, with local leaders less able 
to levy informal taxes.  
67  At the same time, while we observe imperfect matching of project selection to citizen preferences across treatment and 
control communities, preference alignment is higher in treatment communities. Some of this misalignment in treatment 
communities can likely be explained by the role that the NGO played in shaping some decisions about project 
outcomes. For example, despite citizens’ preference for health care facilities, communities were dissuaded from 
constructing health posts, given external concerns about the sustainability of their management. To some degree, this 
may indicate that the CDD programme limited certain types of public goods being produced, in line with Rawlings et al. 
(2004). 
68  This is in contrast to the idea that external aid can distort the accountability relationships between taxpayers and local 
leaders (Fjeldstad 2001; Moore 1998, 2004), but is in line with a more nuanced understanding of the relationship 
between aid, tax and accountability, which highlights the importance of how aid is structured and delivered for 
determining its impact on local revenue-raising and accountability (Prichard et al. 2012). 
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actions, we speculate that though information is being shared less frequently in treatment 
communities, decision-making seems to be more inclusive when it does happen. 
Nevertheless, our findings give us reason to be sceptical of the impact of top-down 
transparency measures, particularly when relying on digital media. For one, while the 
majority of individuals reported believing that clan elders and religious leaders involve them 
in decision-making, the majority of clan leaders also reported that they have total authority to 
make decisions on behalf of the community without having to get community input (Appendix 
F Figure F4). At the same time there is also a possibility that, because leaders knew project 
information was going to be publicly tracked via the Sokaab platform, they had less incentive 
to provide information to citizens – regardless of how easily citizens were able to access that 
information in practice. Indeed, our evidence suggests that the tracking platform was not 
accessible to all community members.69 Future research may further explore the impact of 
transparency requirements, including the relative value of more frequent versus more 
inclusive meetings, and the incentive for leaders to share more or less information as a result 
of the project design.  
Though our outcomes suggest that the matching grant programme encouraged individuals in 
treatment communities to take ownership over local public goods, we are nevertheless 
unable to test one of the central assumptions underpinning the requirements for community 
contributions within CDD programmes – that individuals are more likely to hold their leaders 
to account and to take ownership over the project when they contribute directly to projects. 
As explained in Appendix I, in treatment communities individuals who contributed to the 
DIALOGUE programme were more likely than those who did not to engage in actions that 
indicate they are demanding accountability of local leaders. While the finding is only 
correlational, it does suggestion some support for a link between informal tax payment and 
accountability. However, given that both treatment and control communities undertook new 
development projects through informal contributions, we are unable to assess the impact of 
the contributions themselves, as opposed to the co-financing package given in treatment 
communities. Future research could usefully explore the extent to which these outcomes 
could be achieved with a transparent grant without community contributions.70 Moreover, 
despite the positive outcomes, given the timeframe of data collection we are unable to 
explore the longer-term impact of the programme on the sustainability of public goods 
outcomes. This is important given that a key assumption embedded within the requirement 
for local financing is the greater sustainability of the public goods over time – with the idea 
that where they have contributed to their construction, citizens will be more likely to continue 
to invest in the maintenance of the public goods in the future – as well as evidence 
 
69  The platform may have been inaccessible for two key reasons. First, internet usage in the case districts is low. As many 
as 79% of the 1,300 interviewees reported never using the internet as a source of information at baseline. Likewise, in 
57% of the villages the cell service is, if not unreliable, of average quality. Second, as noted above, taxpayer knowledge 
about the projects is likewise low, indicating that knowledge available on the Sokaab platform was not available to all 
community members, including those that contributed to the public works projects. In treatment villages, only 60% of 
respondents were aware that the new community projects were related to the DIALOGUE programme.   
70  An open question remains about the extent to which the role of an external actor alone may have led to these positive 
outcomes, rather than the co-financing combination. Evidence from a subsequent study of matching grants, informal 
revenue generation and trust in Somalia found that NGO oversight was a key driver of trust in the overall project and 
resultant positive perceptions of citizens (Bandula-Irwin 2021), rather than the requirement for local financing. Despite 
the theory of tax and accountability predicting that leaders will be more accountable where they are reliant on local 
financing, it is possible that external grants alone may have led to greater demands for answerability if citizens believed 
that future funding may be dependent on the NGO perceiving positive outcomes. While, as noted in Section 4, we find 
no evidence of individual responses being shaped by a desire to be seen positively by an NGO, we do find evidence 
that community leaders may be more conscious of ensuring that outcomes are portrayed as being in line with NGO 
preferences. It is thus possible that they were influenced by a desire to be seen as accountable to external rather than 
local actors. Future research may usefully explore how different modalities of aid delivery influence the accountability 
relations between citizens and local leaders. This is particularly the case given the long history and importance of NGOs 
in the region, which implies that it may be necessary to consider further the extent to which results were influenced by 
the NGOs’ prior interactions with communities, and perceptions of their ability to ensure external monitoring of funds that 
enabled more positive developments (Usmani et al. 2018; see also Peters et al. 2018; Vivalt 2020). Accordingly, the 
replicability of our findings to regions with less prior history or trust in NGOs is uncertain.  
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elsewhere that external interventions and grants, particularly in relation to CDD programmes, 
do not necessarily have long-term transformative effects (e.g. Casey et al. 2011).  
6.2 Spillover effects for state and non-state actors 
 
In addition to the direct project outcomes, our findings point to important spillover effects of 
the matching grant programme on local state and non-state governance actors. First, we find 
no crowding-out effects on other forms of informal revenue-raising; by contrast, we actually 
find positive spillover effects of the matching grant programme on other types of informal 
revenue generation. This implies that requirements for local financing did not simply shift 
revenue away from the financing of other public goods and systems of social welfare 
provision. This is in line with research on informal taxation in other contexts that shows that 
formal and informal taxes are not necessarily substitutes, and may thus not result in 
crowding-out effects (van den Boogaard 2020b: 259-292). Meanwhile our previous research 
in the context gives us good reason to speculate that individuals do not perceive different 
types of informal taxes as substitutes (van den Boogaard and Santoro 2021), but rather as 
often distinct types of payments serving different purposes that are not necessarily in 
competition. Meanwhile, we find no effects of the programme on formal tax collection, though 
this is unsurprising in the context given limited baseline formal tax collection, and the 
underlying lack of capacity of the local government to collect and enforce taxation.  
Second, we find that the matching grant programme led citizens to hold more positive 
perceptions of the legitimacy of clan leaders, religious leaders and the district government. 
This finding is particularly surprising in the case of the district government, given that it did 
not have a role in funding the public goods undertaken, and, all things being equal, may not 
be expected to get credit for the results. Our evidence thus points to important 
complementarities between formal and informal institutions, in contrast to common 
assumptions that formal institutions are at odds with informal institutions or de facto modes of 
governance.71 Rather than showing that public goods provided by state and non-state actors 
being substitutes, and thus in competition with each other (see e.g. Acemoglu et al. 2020), 
our research contributes to a growing body of evidence pointing to the complementarities 
between state and non-state actors in governance and service provision (Baldwin 2015, 
2019; Baldwin and Holzinger 2019; Cammett and MacLean 2014; Sacks 2012), between 
formal and informal institutions, and between formal and informal taxation (van den 
Boogaard 2020b; van den Boogaard and Santoro 2021). More broadly, our findings align 
with a growing body of research that shows the ways in which customary and state authority 
can be complementary, with perceptions of traditional authority positively linked to elected 
government officials (Baldwin 2013, 2015; Chlouba 2020; Henn 2018; Holzinger et al. 2016; 
Logan 2009; Van der Windt et al. 2018). 
This finding is particularly significant as it indicates the potential for the programme to spur a 
virtuous cycle of governance (Blair and Winters 2020; Schmelzle and Stollenwerk 2018), with 
increased legitimacy linked to quasi-voluntary tax compliance, linked to greater tax revenue, 
linked to greater capacity to provide public goods, linked to greater legitimacy. While we do 
not assess the impact of the programme on quasi-voluntary tax compliance or the longer-
term impact on local state tax capacity, our findings nevertheless suggest that co-financed 
CDD programmes may be able to contribute in some contexts to overcoming the ‘low-tax, 
low-capacity’ trap faced by many low-income states. Our findings are particularly important in 
the context of Gedo region, where all levels of the Somali government have limited reach and 
capacity, because of the overall lack of legitimacy and capacity of local governments (World 
Bank 2020: 93-97), and the importance of the legitimacy of state actors to the viability of 
ongoing statebuilding processes. The state sees the importance of this outcome for its 
capacity to rule. According to an official from the Jubbaland Ministry of Finance, ‘The type of 
 
71  For an illustration of this view in the context of Somalia, see e.g. World Bank (2020: 86, 103).  
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participation that the DIALOGUE project pursues has enhanced a sense of ownership in all 
project activities and has increased trust between government and citizens. In turn, citizens 
feel that the governance system has changed and that the government is ready to deliver 
services to the village level’ (cited in SSF (2019).  
In exploring the causal links between the matching grant programme and legitimacy of the 
governance actors, we find only partial evidence that legitimacy was strengthened through 
more frequent interactions with non-state leaders, and no evidence that greater engagement 
with state officials had any impact on citizen perceptions of legitimacy. This may reflect a key 
point noted by Dreier and Lake (2019): the impact of engagement may have more profound 
effects on citizen trust in the state rather than citizen perceptions of the state’s legitimacy.72 
Alternatively, and in line with literature linking effective public goods provision and positive 
perceptions of the state, we find significant evidence of a positive relationship between the 
DIALOGUE programme and perceptions of the transparency, trust and performance of the 
district government, clan elders and religious leaders, indicating that a performance-based 
mechanism helps to explain observed outcomes. This indicates that where informal revenue 
generation helps to finance valued public goods, taxpayers may view the state as doing its 
job and more trustworthy – even if it does not control the revenue. The fact that the 
performance of village leaders was not similarly affected by the matching grant programme 
helps to explain why perceptions of their legitimacy did not increase as a result of the 
programme – future research could usefully further parse the heterogeneous role of local 
governance actors in order to explain this anomaly.  
Meanwhile, though respondents did not directly attribute the programme to the local state, 
evidence from elsewhere suggests that citizens may give credit to state actors for playing a 
role in facilitating aid or service delivery, even where the state has no direct role in the 
outcomes.73 In Gedo region, it may be the case that individuals credited the local government 
for enabling the programme in indirect ways – which van den Boogaard (2020b) suggests 
may include lobbying for development programmes, allowing NGOs to access physical 
space, or giving necessary authorisation. As described in other contexts of contested political 
orders, the delivery of public goods and services by non-state providers can in and of itself 
be viewed by citizens as something worthy of recognition, with the idea that the state is 
acting as a broker or intermediary of development rather than a direct service provider (see 
e.g. McCarthy and Farrelly 2020; van den Boogaard 2020b). This indirect role is plausible 
given that the Somali Stability Fund (2019),74 the funder of the DIALOGUE programme, 
notes that the programme improved collaboration with the state and district government, 
which, given the underlying tension between Gedo/ Jubbaland (see Section 2), it sees as a 
‘welcome by-product of the DIALOGUE project’.  
As above, there is some question of the extent to which the complementarities that we 
observe between different forms of informal taxation, and between co-financing and the 
legitimacy of local governance actors, will travel to contexts with less well-established or less 
well-trusted informal tax and governance institutions. Given the history and importance of 
informal tax and twilight institutions, future research should further explore the relationship 
between informal taxing institutions, and between informal taxing institutions and the state, in 
 
72  Relying on data from 29 countries in sub-Saharan Africa, they note that ‘it is individuals’ trust in the institutions of the 
state (specifically, the agent that represent it) that breaks down in the face of negative first-hand experiences, rather 
than their faith in the institutions themselves’. 
73  Considering the role of NGOs in service provision, e.g. Sacks (2012: 3) finds that non-state provision of services 
strengthens, rather than undermines, citizens’ legitimating beliefs about the state when ‘citizens view their government 
as essential to leveraging and managing these external resources’, with citizens crediting the state for development 
outcomes. Similarly, Winters et al. (2018) suggest that the very presence of external aid can signal government 
competence to citizens, and Cruz and Schneider (2017) note that attribution of credit for NGO work can be ambiguous 
to evaluate, as citizens may reasonably infer that government helped to coordinate NGOs’ efforts.  
74  The Somali Stability Fund is a multi-donor initiative financed by Denmark, the EU, the Netherlands, Sweden, the UK and 
the United Arab Emirates. It is administered by a private consultancy firm, Adam Smith International.  
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diverse contexts. At the same time, we are unable to assess the longer-term transformational 
impact of the matching grant programme. Future research would be valuable in assessing 
the time sensitivity of improved citizens’ perceptions of governance actors. More generally, 
we are unable to assess whether citizen perceptions of the legitimacy of the local 
government extends to higher levels of government,75 particularly in Gedo region, given its 
uniquely strained relationship with the Jubbaland state administration. Beyond Gedo region, 
it is unclear whether the complementarities may exist beyond the local governance level, 
where external interventions have been most effective (Menkhaus 2014c: 162-166), given 
uneven support for the ongoing federalising and statebuilding process more broadly across 
south-central Somalia (see e.g. Allen and Gundel 2017; Crouch and Chevreau 2016; Mosley 
2015).76  
 
7  Implications for development partners and 
the Somali state 
 
Despite the limitations to external validity discussed above, our findings have important 
implications for how international and state actors engage with informal institutions and non-
state actors in revenue-raising and the provision of public goods in Somalia. The dominant 
view of statebuilding programmes in Somalia has been that informal governance has no 
significance to statebuilding, thus leading international actors to focus exclusively on formal 
state institutions and processes.77 The donor community has invested heavily in formal 
institutions, underpinned by ‘the assumption that the government can boost its legitimacy by 
delivering services to the population in areas under its authority, and that, moreover, this 
should take place within a framework of downward accountability, reinforced as the 
government funds its services from domestic taxation and revenue generation’ (de Waal 
2017: 21; see also Federal Republic of Somalia 2013; Hearn and Zimmerman 2014; IMF 
2017; UNOSOM 2014; World Bank 2017). Meanwhile, humanitarian and development 
partners have often treated informal institutions and non-state actors as a stop-gap measure: 
necessary to delivery essential public goods and services in the face of state failure and 
weakness, but something that will fade away. As Menkhaus (2006: 102) notes: ‘Somalia’s 
informal systems of governance have generally been accorded little to no role in external 
efforts to revive a conventional state … The accepted, unspoken wisdom has been that local, 
informal systems of governance are of little significance, mere variations on a broader theme 
of anarchy. They are viewed as short-term coping mechanisms to be replaced by formal 
state authority once the elusive state-building projects succeeds’. 
 
In contrast to these common views, our evidence suggests that, in Gedo region, co-financing 
development through community-based informal revenue generation may both be a means 
of supporting public goods provision in a context of weak formal taxation, and reinforcing the 
authority of the local state. While the focus of the international community has been on 
formal institutions, formal tax capacity and top-down accountability, we show that state 
legitimacy, at least at the local level, can also emerge through informal taxation and 
 
75  Research elsewhere indicates that informal revenue generation can impact broader measures of state legitimacy, 
focused at the national level (van den Boogaard 2020b), though given the tenuous nature of the federation in Somalia, 
the extent to which similar positive relationships extend to higher levels of government is uncertain.  
76 We expect that outcomes for governance actors will differ depending on the government actor involved and the degree 
to which community leaders support that actor or the broader statebuilding project at the sub-national or federal level.  
77  Statebuilding in Somalia has largely been a top-down and externally-driven process, centrally focused on the Federal 
Government of Somalia and the Federal Member States (de Waal 2017; Hagmann 2016; Menkhaus 2006, 2014b, 
2014a; Stremlau 2016). See Chandler (2007) for a discussion of how the role of international institutions in shaping the 
goals of statebuilding has limited the viability of alternative models of statebuilding in fragile contexts. 
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engagement with local non-state leaders.78 In practice this implies the need to take into 
account the role and importance of informal institutions, recognise their potentially 
complementary relationship to state institutions, and incorporate them within a model of 
‘mediated’ statehood (Menkhaus 2007, 2014). Such a mediated model of statehood 
understands public authority to be multifaceted, involving interaction between formal and 
informal actors that ‘are (partly) dependent on each other and therefore (partly) shape each 
other’s governance projects’ (Stel 2017: 368).79 In this context, our evidence suggests that 
development partners may effectively work with communities and community leaders – 
essentially, to work with the grain of existing social and governance structures – without 
undermining state actors, and potentially even strengthening the state’s legitimacy.80 Rather 
than simply trying to recreate institutions ‘in the self-image of the Western liberal state’ 
(Cramer 2006: 257), working with non-state actors to raise revenue and deliver services may 
represent an effective mode of governance in the context of south-central Somalia. Building 
on our evidence, this view of modern statehood in Somalia implies that informal institutions 
are not simply a product of failed governance, and thus something that will lose strength or 
importance as state institutions strengthen. Rather, informal institutions and non-state actors 
are deeply intertwined with the mediated state.81  
Despite these possibilities, international development partners need to consider at least three 
interrelated risks before partnering with local leaders in hybrid revenue-raising and service 
provision, or requiring informal contributions as a condition for receiving development aid. 
First, relying on or requiring community contributions risks reinforcing unaccountable informal 
institutions and non-democratically elected leaders, effectively ‘distorting the normal 
democratic process that is supposed to legitimize public action’ (De Herdt and Olivier de 
Sardan 2015: 11). As described in Section 2, the risks of elite capture of CDD programmes is 
considerable, particularly in the context of Somalia where local leaders have considerable 
power and influence.82 In the context of Gedo region this need for caution is considerable, 
 
78  In this context, our findings may imply that greater accountability is possible through local engagement and hybrid co-
financing models, in particular because of the long history of ‘the role of external aid in dysfunctional statebuilding’ and 
‘elite extraversion’ (Hagmann 2016: 6, 10), which has often undermined the accountability of external aid.  
79  This in line with Migdal’s (1994: 20-21) notion that the state is but one actor of many social forces that seek to ‘mobilize 
followers and exercise power’. As Menkhaus (2006: 103) notes, a mediated state relies on diverse actors, including 
local intermediaries and rival sources of authority, ‘to execute core functions of government and mediate relations 
between local communities and the state’. 
80  This accords with ideas that in conflict-affected contexts and areas of limited statehood, it may be particularly important 
to work with informal institutions and local leaders with a ‘good-enough governance’ or ‘functional governance’ approach 
(see e.g. Hickey 2012; Meagher et al. 2014; Menkhaus 2006; Ramalingam et al. 2014). Working with local leaders in the 
context of Somalia is particularly sensible given that ‘real political power’ is ‘radically decentralized’ (Menkhaus 1998: 
224), while ‘formal state structures have rarely been effective’ (Menkhaus 2011: 11). Citizens view non-state actors 
more positively than the state across a range of measures (van den Boogaard and Santoro 2021), while there is a 
growing body of evidence of the ways in which local elites may be more effective at mobilising revenue and delivering 
services than the state in areas of weak formal statehood (see e.g. Acemoglu et al. 2020; Alatas et al. 2019; Balán et al. 
2020; Basurto et al. 2020; van den Boogaard 2020b). 
81  This is in line with van den Boogaard (2020b: 347), who argues that ‘Informality does not simply disappear with 
modernisation; instead, it is a deeply modern phenomenon, underpinning the state and its authority. States may use 
informal taxing actors to bolster state authority and expansion, while IRG [informal revenue generation] can support 
statebuilding processes’. It is also in line with broader critiques of the view that informality is antithetical to modernity 
and statebuilding, recognising that informality ‘has not been eradicated by economic development, statebuilding, 
globalisation, or the spread of democracy’ (Radnitz 2011: 367; see also Farrell 2009; Ganev 2007; Hertog 2010; Tsai 
2007). Development partners are increasingly recognising that a transitional means of thinking about informal 
institutions may not be appropriate. For example, the World Bank (2020: 90) asks ‘whether such “hybrid” governance 
should be treated as a transitional measure whereby the relative importance of non-state actors decreases as state 
capacity is fully developed, or whether it should be adopted as a long-term governance strategy’ - though it is not yet 
clear how this type of long-term perspective of informality and hybridity fits within their programming. Indeed, 
international actors have ‘struggled to understand these arrangements and their place in wider state-building efforts’ 
(Menkhaus 2014c: 154). See Chandler (2007) for a discussion of how the role of international institutions in shaping the 
goals of statebuilding has limited the viability of alternative models of statebuilding in fragile contexts.  
82  For example, Bryld et al. (2013) highlight some of the negative impact of having to rely on gatekeepers in order to 
access communities or programme beneficiaries, while Hoehne (2010, 2011) shows how clan elites and authorities in 
Sool region in Somaliland are viewed by some in the community as political opportunists. Meanwhile, in Somaliland 
Renders and Tenderlin (2010) show that informal hybrid arrangements may not be socially legitimate. For broader 
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given the uneven nature of clan decision-making, the lack of inclusiveness of local 
governance, and the considerable influence and capacity of leaders to extract revenue from 
citizens.83 For instance, as noted above, the majority of clan leaders reported that they have 
total authority to make decisions on behalf of the community, without having to get 
community input. Meanwhile, while perceptions of clan elders and religious leaders are more 
positive than perceptions of the district governments, perceptions of these leaders’ 
transparency and performance are still relatively low (van den Boogaard and Santoro 2021). 
At the same time, while external actors may label community contributions within CDD as 
voluntary, our research in the region suggests that the majority of individuals do not view 
informal taxes as voluntary.84 In this context, relying on clan leadership has particularly 
important implications for vulnerable and marginalised populations that are excluded from 
local institutions of governance, including women and members of minority clan groups (Hill 
2010; Hudson et al. 2015; Majid and McDowell 2012).85 Accordingly, and recognising the 
distortive potential of aid in fragile contexts and in Somalia in particular (see Hagmann 2016; 
Menkhaus 2014a), projects supported should be conscious of local incentives, minorities, 
and should be relatively small and well-calibrated to avoid potential distortions of local 
institutions and accountability relations (Menkhaus 2014c).86 
Second, while relying on informal revenue generation may help to fill gaps left by weak state 
capacity, it nevertheless has important equity and distributional implications. Existing 
evidence across diverse contexts shows that informal taxation is often regressive (see e.g. 
Evans et al. 2020; McCarthy 2016; Olken and Singhal 2011; van den Boogaard et al. 2019; 
Walker 2017). Our research in south-central Somalia shows that while vulnerable 
populations are less likely to pay informal taxes and fees, informal payments are regressive 
at the intensive margin among those that make any payments (van den Boogaard and 
Santoro 2021). In considering the distributional effects of informal taxation within the 
DIALOGUE programme, we find that richer households in treatment communities are only 
slightly more likely than poorer ones to contribute to the DIALOGUE-related project, 
indicating weak evidence of progressivity at the extensive margin (see Figure 2). At the 
intensive margin, however, we find stronger evidence of a progressive effect on the first four 
wealth quintiles, though this fades away with the top quintile. These results should be taken 
with a note of caution: while we are sufficiently powered to explore the extensive margin with 
the full sample, the intensive margin analysis becomes noisier, given that a smaller portion of 
respondents self-report having contributed to DIALOGUE with a non-zero payment. We 
leave a more in-depth investigation of these equity outcomes to future research.  
 
discussion of concerns about equity and inclusivity within CDD programmes, see Huq (2020); Mansuri and Rao (2004); 
McCarthy et al. (2016); Saguin (2018).  
83  In Somalia, there is considerable variation in how clan leaders are selected. Some are hereditary (common among 
Darod and Dir clans), others are elected by a council comprised of heads of tribal sections (Hinds 2013; Lewis 1988). 
Regardless of selection process, many observers describe the ways in which traditional clan authorities have been 
integrated into formal political structures has distorted traditional legitimacy and accountability processes between 
elders and communities (see e.g. Hussein 2018; Ssereo 2003; Zoppi 2017)‘. 
84  Across all informal tax types, an average of 70% of taxpayers reported that punishment is likely for non-payment of 
informal payments - a notably higher percentage than for the formal livestock tax (the only formal tax that more than 
10% of respondents paid), for which only 42% of taxpayers believed that non-payment was likely to result in punishment 
(van den Boogaard and Santoro 2021). Meanwhile, in a parallel study of matching grants in Somaliland, evidence 
suggests that despite frequent communication from the NGO (the DRC) about the voluntary nature of contributions, 
many citizens believed contributions were mandatory, with indications that people felt some pressure or obligation to 
contribute to religious leaders and clan elders (Bandula-Irwin 2021). This is in line with theoretical understandings of 
informal taxation as often being viewed as mandatory by individuals (van den Boogaard 2020b), and with broader 
evidence pointing to considerable variation in how individuals in communities perceive contributions in practice (see 
Rawlings et al. 2004). 
85  As described by Hill (2010: 3), ‘the clan structure affords protection and privilege to majority groups’, while ‘minorities 
suffer marginalisation and exclusion from mainstream economic, social and political life’. 
86  As Hagmann (2016: 60) argues, ‘More effort is required to identify formal and informal institutions … which have existed 
before and independently of external funding opportunities and which might become partners for joint statebuilding 
interventions at local and national levels’. 
 36 
 
Figure 2 Likelihood (left) and incidence (right) of informal contributions to the 
DIALOGUE programme by HH wealth quintiles 
 
While our evidence thus does not suggest that the matching grants programme in Gedo 
exacerbated inequity, it is nevertheless true that, in the absence of a centralised 
redistributive system, the programme reinforces disparate decentralised systems of 
redistribution that create community-level inequities.87 Indeed, the localisation of public 
goods finance and funding public goods through voluntary contributions means that the 
quality of public goods – and whether they exist at all – depends on the relative wealth of a 
particular community, implying uneven sub-national distributional effects (van den Boogaard 
2020b, 2020a). In Somalia, where essential services or social welfare are dependent on 
informal networks, the risk of excluding the most vulnerable is high (see Maxwell and Majid 
2016: 114-115). In Gedo region, we find that on average individuals in wealthier communities 
make more informal payments and contributions than in poorer ones, reinforcing our 
understanding that ‘where there is no centralised redistributive system, communities will 
have unequal capacity to fill the revenue and service provision gap left by the state’ (van den 
Boogaard and Santoro 2021). Donor requirements for community contributions in CDD 
programmes often take into consideration levels of poverty overall,88 though not necessarily 
inequity within communities. Where community contributions are required by CDD 
programmes, ‘The inability to pay can limit the participation of poorer communities and 
poorer groups within communities’ (White et al. 2018; see also Chase 2002; Nkonya et al. 
2008). This raises some questions, therefore, about the value of matching grants versus 
 
87  Similarly, evaluations of CDD have found that, while it can be effective in building infrastructure, it does not actually 
transform social relations or have an impact on equity, inclusion or empowerment (3ie 2018; Casey 2018; McCarthy et 
al. 2016; Mvukiyehe and van der Windt 2020; Saguin 2018; Vajja and White 2008; Wong 2012; Wong and Guggenheim 
2018).  
88  For example, in the Philippines and Indonesia Wong (2012) finds that mandated community contributions within World 
Bank CDD programmes were often waived because of extreme poverty, while in other cases contribution requirements 
were lowered because they were found to be ‘too onerous’. 
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equalisation payments, which may not have the same effects of consolidating or increasing 
inequity across regions (see e.g. Shah 2010, 2014). 
More fundamentally, though requirements for community contributions are often justified on 
the basis of a lack of tax payment and contribution to public goods funding,89 a growing body 
of research shows that households and communities have high informal tax burdens and 
contribute a great deal to public goods provision (Olken and Singhal 2011; Paler et al. 2017; 
van den Boogaard et al. 2019). In Gedo region, we find that over 70 per cent of respondents 
report having paid at least one informal tax or fee in the previous year, with informal 
payments representing on average 9.5 per cent of annual household income (van den 
Boogaard and Santoro 2021). This raises questions about the fairness of placing the 
responsibility of poverty reduction upon the poor themselves, while, as Fine (2015) argues, 
failing to address structural issues of poverty and vulnerability.  
Finally, and relatedly, where communities are required to raise informal revenue locally in 
order to receive support from development partners or the government, there is a risk of 
institutionalising a non-universal conception of citizenship and rights. In conflict-affected 
contexts in particular, there are important questions remaining about the distributional impact 
of both aid and community contributions, and the implications for social cohesion and 
stability.90 With any non-universal distribution of benefits, there is a risk that non-beneficiary 
groups will be dissatisfied with the outcomes or perceive unfairness in the process or 
outcome of distribution. In other contexts, intragroup conflict has been documented as a 
result of the distribution of non-universal benefits (see e.g. Pavanello et al. 2016; Samuels et 
al. 2013). We find some evidence that these concerns are valid in the context of the 
DIALOGUE programme. As described in Table 9, we find no significant differences across 
treatment and control communities in perceptions of how communities were selected to 
receive matching grants (col. 2). Unsurprisingly, given the high demand for matching grants 
across all communities, respondents in treatment communities are significantly happier in the 
selection outcome than those in control communities (col. 4). Critically for concerns about the 
link between non-universal benefits and social cohesion, we find a marginally significant 
increase in treatment communities of perceptions that the matching grant programme 
created resentment and competition between villages that were selected to receive the 
treatment package and those that were not (col. 6). Meanwhile, although the DIALOGUE 
programme aimed to increase social cohesion in part by incentivising inter-settlement and 
inter-clan cooperation (see Section 3), we see no significant effects of the programme on 
individuals’ reported trust in other clans (col. 8). 
  
 
89  As Walker (2011: 17) argues, ‘The practice of raising additional funds for local development from community members 
has a number of advantages … [t]hese individuals are rarely subject to income tax and therefore shoulder a very small 
tax burden. Some form of voluntary co-payment seems justified for public projects that offer direct benefits to the local 
community’. 
90  While CDD is often thought to increase social cohesion (e.g. Kim et al. 2020), a growing body of evidence suggests that 
in both the short and long run CDD delivers on infrastructure, but does not lead to positive or significant changes in 
social cohesion or other welfare outcomes (e.g. 3ie 2018; Casey 2018; Humphreys et al. 2012; Mansuri and Rao 2004; 
McCarthy et al. 2016; Mvukiyehe and van der Windt 2020; Vajja and White 2008; White et al. 2018; Wong 2012; Wong 
and Guggenheim 2018). 
 38 
 
Table 9 DIALOGUE impact on cross-community resentment91 





















Dialogue -0.04 -0.04 0.19*** 0.19*** 0.10* 0.11* -0.04 -0.03 
 (0.05) (0.05) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) 
         
Controls  No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes 
         
Village FE  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Control Y 
endline 
0.83 0.83 0.70 0.70 0.43 0.43 0.79 0.79 
Control Y 
baseline 
- - - - - - 0.83 0.83 
R-sq. 0.358 0.361 0.382 0.389 0.394 0.397 0.258 0.271 
Observations 880 880 880 880 880 880 872 872 
Standard errors in parentheses. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Baseline outcomes are missing since the questions above 
have been asked at endline only. 
 
Nevertheless, where the state and development partners require communities to make 
informal contributions in order to receive support or basic services, it is effectively defining 
who is a worthy or deserving beneficiary (see e.g. Handley 2020: 153-158; McCarthy 2018, 
2019; Meagher 2012; Moskowitz 2017; van den Boogaard 2020b). Relying on informal 
systems of tax collection and public goods delivery thus has significant implications – not 
only for distributional outcomes, but also for related ideas of the rights and benefits of 
citizenship. A non-universal conception of citizenship has important implications both for 
equity outcomes and for social cohesion and stability at a broader scale than we are able to 
assess through this research. National and sub-national politics in Somalia have long been 
fraught with tensions over who is included and excluded from development and state- and 
nation-building processes. As noted in section 3, for example, in Gedo region the Marehan 
clan dominates local political institutions, at the expense of minority populations, while there 
are further divisions within the Marehan that can create conflicts over power and resources.92 
At the same time, broader clan-based tensions in Jubbaland state and south-central Somalia 
can create tensions over resource distribution. Since the start of the civil war in 1988, 
resources have been deeply contested by clans, particularly in the Jubba regions (Menkhaus 
2012: 4), with tensions emerging because of a lack of perceived fairness in the distribution of 
resources and service delivery, exclusion of women, and marginalisation of smaller clans 
(Rift Valley Institute 2017).93 In any context, though particularly such a fragile one, a non-
universal conception of citizenship or distribution of development has the potential to further 
sow mistrust and inter- and intra-group tensions.94 These risks require donor engagement to 
 
91  Survey questions: (i) in col. 1-2, ‘How do you think your village has been (not) chosen to participate in this programme?’; 
(ii) in col. 3-4, ‘How happy or unhappy are you that you were (not) chosen to participate in this programme?’; (iii) in col. 
5-6, ‘Do you think the matching grant project created some resentment and competition among villages that were 
selected to participate and those that weren’t?’; (iv) in col. 7-8, ‘In general, how much trust or mistrust do you have 
towards people that do not belong to your clan’. 
92  Minority populations include the Raxanweyn, Ogaden and Harti clans and Bantu populations, while there is an intraclan 
split between original habitants (guri) and new settlers (galti). These divisions are neither universal nor inevitable. 
Indeed, in Luuq district, clan leaders established a guurti in the early 2000s that included representation of both the 
Raxanweyn and Marehan clan families (Gundel 2006). 
93  The consequence of feeling excluded in this context is significant - e.g. fuelling al-Shabaab’s recruitment and support 
(Menkhaus 2012: 5; Mwangi 2016). 
94  Of course, a non-universal allocation of resources tied to clear, public and predictable criteria - whether informal 
community contributions or the need of the community - may still be less likely to increase tension or negatively affect 
social cohesion than government-based redistribution, which is widely viewed as being characterised by patronage and 
clan-based interests (e.g. Ingiriis 2015). This is relevant when thinking whether CDD programmes may eventually be 
taken over by the state. In the meantime, however, development partners need to consider the implications and risks of 
incentivising informal taxing institutions as opposed to delivering aid through other more equalising modalities. 
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be informed by contextual knowledge, rather than ‘template-driven projects’ (Menkhaus, 
2014c: 154), with an emphasis on accountability, equity and inclusion. 
 
8  Conclusions 
 
Our research in Gedo region in south-central Somalia shows that CDD programmes that 
incorporate grants matched to informal community-level contributions can effectively 
incentivise contributions for public goods and improve the quality of public goods, suggesting 
that matching grants can both build on and build social capital and incentivise local collective 
action. Our findings shed new light on the causal mechanisms linking CDD programmes to 
more positive public goods outcomes, showing that such a programme in Somalia had an 
effect through both citizens’ greater sense of their rights to demand answers of leaders and 
external pressure on leaders to be more transparent and inclusive with local revenue-raising 
and project management. Importantly, this programme did not crowd out other forms of 
informal revenue generation important to local governance and public goods provision. 
Instead, we find that the CDD programme increased other forms of informal contributions 
and strengthened the legitimacy of the local government, which played no direct role in the 
programme, as well as some local non-state actors. Despite the risks associated with 
informal taxation, especially with regard to equity and the exclusion of sub-populations, our 
findings indicate that co-financing of CDD through informal taxation can have a positive 
impact on social capital, local public goods outcomes, and state and non-state governance 
actors. These results are striking, contributing to our understanding of the ways in which 
external intervention can increase social capital and local collective action (Casey et al. 
2013; Fearon et al. 2009), the causal mechanisms between community participation and 
public goods outcomes, and the potential complementarities between formal and informal 
institutions in a context of weak state institutional capacity. Exploring whether co-financing 
supports virtuous or adverse cycles of governance – essentially, whether it fuels or helps to 
overcome low-tax, low-capacity traps – has particularly important implications in a weak and 
fragile institutional context like Somalia. Indeed, while the international community has 
invested heavily in supporting the creation of formal state institutions at both the federal and 
sub-national level, it has, likewise, predominately delivered services outside state channels 
and relies on local leaders and informal institutions in order to deliver services and aid.95 
While our research thus has important theoretical and policy implications, it also raises new 
questions for future research. First, as discussed above, given the potentially unique context 
of Gedo region, future research may usefully test whether our results hold in an area not 
dominated by a single clan, that is less stable, or where the co-financing actor had less 
history of engagement in the region. Likewise, given the relatively unique context of Somalia, 
with its long history of non-state actors and informal revenue generation being critical to local 
governance and service provision, future research should explore the extent to which our 
results persist in less extreme cases. As noted above, informal revenue generation is 
prevalent across weak state institutional contexts, while there are some indications that 
informal taxing institutions may lead to greater state legitimacy in other contexts. Our 
understanding of these relationships and the causal mechanisms nevertheless remains 
relatively limited. 
Second, while we find a positive relationship between the matching grant programme and the 
legitimacy of the district government, we were limited in asking about support for broader 
ongoing statebuilding processes in the region. Future research may explore the extent to 
which different levels of government enjoy positive benefits from the matching grant 
 
95  De Waal (2017) notes that only about 8% of official development assistance is delivered directly to the FGS Ministry of 
Finance, which is well below the 15% target that has been agreed by donors. 
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programme, and the extent to which citizen support translates to broader support for ongoing 
statebuilding processes. As described above, research elsewhere indicates that informal 
revenue generation can impact broader measures of state legitimacy, focused at the national 
level. Given the tenuous nature of the federation in Somalia, the extent to which similar 
positive relationships extend to higher levels of government is uncertain. These questions 
have important implications for international development partners, who, as noted above, 
focus support to a much greater extent to the federal government and the federal member 
states, rather than local government institutions – many of which have not yet been formally 
established. 
Third, future work is required to enable a more nuanced understanding of the results and 
causal mechanisms at play. For instance, while we observe no ‘crowding-out’ effects on 
other informal contributions, and while we speculate that this is indicative of individuals not 
perceiving different types of informal taxes as substitutes, it remains unclear why the CDD 
programme actually led to increases in some types of informal taxes. Future research could 
thus usefully test this unexpected finding, deepening our understanding of the relationships 
between CDD programmes and informal revenue generation, between different types of 
informal taxes, and between informal and formal taxes. Likewise, though we find positive 
relationships between the matching grant programme and the legitimacy and perceptions of 
the district government and other local actors, we do not know why these positive effects do 
not extend to village leaders. We may reasonably expect that individuals perceived that 
village leaders had a less important direct or indirect brokerage role in the CDD programme, 
though future research could test this speculation across diverse programmes. 
Fourth, while our evidence shows that hybrid financing of public goods through community 
contributions and NGO funding channelled through the state can have a positive impact on 
perceptions of the government and formal tax morale, this positive outcome may reasonably 
depend on satisfaction with the outcomes, while the longevity of the positive association is 
uncertain. Evidence suggests that dissatisfaction with outcomes, whether in terms of quality 
of public goods or preference alignment, may negatively affect citizen perceptions of the 
state (Schmelzle and Stollenwerk 2018; Stollenwerk 2018). Thus, there is some question of 
how the relationship between matching grants, informal revenue generation and attitudes 
towards the state may vary according to the desirability of the public goods produced or in 
contexts with less evidence of inclusive decision-making. At the same time, given the 
relatively short timeframe involved, the extent to which the boosts that we observe, in terms 
of positive spill-overs on state and non-state actors, last over time is uncertain. 
 
Finally, and importantly, future research should further explore the equity and distributional 
implications of matching grants before considering extending this model of financing and 
service delivery to other regions. As discussed, this impact is particularly important given the 
overall regressivity of informal revenue generation, and should inform development partners’ 
and policymakers’ engagement with informal taxing institutions and formal-informal hybrid 
financing modalities. Future research could usefully explore the benefits of matching versus 
equalisation grants, particularly in contexts where local informal revenue generation and 






Appendix A DIALOGUE programme 
Figure A1 Project and data collection timeline96 
 
 









96  In each community, 4 months was allocated for local revenue-raising, though the start date of revenue-raising and the 
time that revenue-raising took varied across communities. Accordingly, the period of revenue-raising and project 











































Photo A1 Community training (Doloow) 
 
Photo source: Danish Refugee Council Somalia 
 
 
Note A1 Data collection 
 
Surveys were conducted by trained enumerators, who were divided into district-level teams, 
with the majority of enumerators residing in their assigned district. The security team at the 
DRC was essential for ensuring that the fieldwork was conducted safely. As described, case 
selection was shaped by the relative security of settlements. The security team provided 
daily security status reports, with teams of enumerators moving only with the permission of 
the security team, who approved areas for research and monitored the situation on the 
ground. When the security situation shifted in any location, data collection was cancelled. At 
the same time, enumerators and field supervisors were critical in interpreting complex 
cultural contexts, monitoring social mores, and potential threats of violence. Their 
embeddedness in local communities (with enumerators selected from each of the three case 
study districts) ensured access to information of relevance to the security of the research 
team and research participants through trust-based relationships.  
 
Despite this grounding in the local context, several further precautions were taken to ensure 
the safety of both the research team and survey respondents. In particular, the survey does 
not ask questions that could be perceived to be overly political or related to the ongoing 
statebuilding processes in Jubbaland state and federally. Accordingly, we ask questions 
about the government at the district level, but not more broadly. At the same time, we do not 
ask questions directly about informal payments made to or relations with militias and armed 
groups, including al-Shabaab.  
 
In every situation, we only engaged with research participants after acquiring informed 
consent, and ensuring that we were able to provide credible guarantees that the research 
would not cause harm to the research participants. Data security and guarantees of 
anonymity were central to the research process. Enumerators included both men and 
women, though field research supervisors in each district were male in order to facilitate the 
movement of research teams. Having a gender-balanced team was important to ensure the 
participation of women in the surveys, interviews and focus group discussions, with female 
enumerators often having greater access to female-headed households.  
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Appendix B Community contributions and matching grants 


















C Luuq 1 Same clan  Meeting hall 155 3,400 3,400 
C Luuq 2 Multi-clan Water 
installation 
200 3,900 7,800 
C Luuq 1 Same clan  School meeting 
hall 
250 3,100 3,100 
C Luuq 1 Same clan  Health post 175 10,001 10,001 
C Luuq 1 Same clan  Dam/water 
catchment 
250 5,049 5,049 
C Luuq 1 Same clan  Meeting hall 170 2,200 2,200 
C Luuq 1 Same clan  Health post 150 2,301 2,301 
C Luuq 1 Same clan  Health post 150 3,300 3,300 
C Luuq 1 Same clan  Meeting hall 160 2,300 2,300 
C Luuq 1 Same clan  Primary school 162 1,700 1,700 
C Luuq 1 Same clan  Primary school 150 2,100 2,100 
C Luuq 1 Same clan  Primary school 165 1,600 1,600 
C Luuq 1 Same clan Meeting hall 150 1,800 1,800 
C Luuq 2 Multi-clan Meeting hall 
with latrines 
and fence 
200 6,500 13,000 
C Dooloow 2 Multi-clan Health care 
(MCH) 
165 6,700 13,400 
C Dooloow 2 Same clan Water 150 4,352 8,704 
C Dooloow 4 Multi-clan Health care 
(MCH) 
150 6,700 20,100 
C Dooloow 4 Multi-clan Conference 
hall 
150 6,700 20,100 
C Dooloow 3 Same clan School 150 3,400 10,200 
C Beled Xaawo 4 Multi-clan Primary school 180 6,501 19,500 
C Beled Xaawo  1 Same clan Health care 
(MCH) 
150 1,903 1,903 
C Beled Xaawo  1 Same clan Health centre 160 2,433 2,433 
C Beled Xaawo  1 Same clan Health post 152 1,660 1,660 
C Beled Xaawo 3  Same clan Primary school 200 1 0 
C Beled Xaawo  1 Same clan Primary and 
secondary 
school 
165 1,315 1,315 
C Beled Xaawo  1 Same clan Farming inputs 160 9,900 9,900 
C Beled Xaawo 5 Multi-clan School and 
water 
installation 
190 1,859 5,577 
C Beled Xaawo  1 Same clan Primary school 155 3,692 3,692 
C Beled Xaawo 3 Same clan Water 
installation 
216 6,600 19,800 
C Beled Xaawo 3 Same clan Construction of 
primary school 
180 2 0 




 24,120 40,000 
D Dooloow N/A N/A Road 
renovation/ 
airport 
 10,000 96,480 
D Beled Xaawo N/A N/A Road 
renovation 
 10,000 40,000 
D Garbahareey N/A N/A Secondary 
school fencing 
 11,500 46,000 
D Elwak N/A N/A Road 
renovation 
 10,507 42,028 
D Bardera N/A N/A Guesthouse 
construction 
 10,001 40,000 
D Burdhubo N/A N/A Road 
renovation 




97  As noted in Section 3, matching grants are more than community contributions in some communities, as the size of the 
matching grant depended on whether the project involved inter-village and inter-clan collaboration.  
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Table B2 DIALOGUE impact on contributions to new projects (community leader 
survey data) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 




















Dialogue 0.12* 0.17** 12.19** 18.03*** 1.07* 1.45** 0.14 0.16 
 (0.06) (0.07) (5.00) (5.60) (0.61) (0.64) (0.32) (0.34) 
         
Controls  No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes 
Control Y 
endline 
0.84 0.84 25.17 25.17 5.76 5.76 3.23 3.23 
R-sq. 0.038 0.204 0.061 0.283 0.033 0.272 0.002 0.157 
Obs. 98 98 93 93 92 92 91 91 
Standard errors in parentheses. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
 
Photo B1 Schools constructed in Beled Xaawo and Luuq 
  






Photo B2 Dooloow airport terminal before and after DIALOGUE programme 
 
Photo source: Danish Refugee Council Somalia 
 
Appendix C Balance and attrition tables98 
 
Table C1 Sample distribution 
 Number of household surveys Number of village leader surveys 
Total Treatment villages Control villages Total Treatment villages Control villages 
880 439 441 98 48 50 
Luuq 159 68 91 25 10 15 
Dooloow 224 143 81 26 17 9 
Beled Xaawo 497 228 269 47 21 26 
 
Table C2 Village characteristics from village leader surveys 
 
 
98 Approximate exchange rate: US$1 = So.Sh. 559. 
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Table C3 Household economic situation from individual surveys 
 





Table C5 IRG from individual surveys 
 
 





Table C7 Attrition: community leader survey 
 
 
Appendix D Descriptive data, settlements 
 
Table D1 Settlement-level data 
     N   Mean   St. dev   p25   Median   p75 
       
Rural village 117 .97 0.16 1 1 1 
 Population 117 1426.4 5686.4 240 476 900 
 Darod Marehan as 
dominant clan 
117 .8 .4 1 1 1 
 Agriculture 115 48.2 26.4 30 50 70 
 Fishing 94 2.3 6.3 0 0 0 
 Breeding 108 34.6 28 5 37.5 60 
 Small business/petty 
trading 
98 5.7 12.9 0 0 5 
 Has a primary school 117 .4 .5 0 0 1 
 Has a public 
hospital/clinic  
117 .1 .3 0 0 0 
 # public meetings last 
year 
116 8 10.4 2 3 10 
 Attendance in last 
public meeting 
97 899.1 5450.1 35 50 150 
 Has a public notice 
board visible 
117 .1 .3 0 0 0 
Male village leader 117 .96 .20 1 1 1 
Village leader tenure 
(years) 





Appendix E Context of study 
 
Figure E1 Number of conflict events per year by district in Gedo region, 2010-202099 
 




99  Conflict events include, as classified by ACLED, battles, explosions/remote violence, riots and violence against civilians. 
Gedo officially comprises six districts, though Buurdhuubo is sometimes considered a separate seventh district. 
However, separate data was not found for Buurdhuubo district.  
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Appendix F DIALOGUE impact on project outcomes 
 
Figure F1 New community development projects 
 










Figure F4 Household (top) versus leader (bottom) perceptions of clan decision-making 





Do you agree or disagree that the following actors involve you in the decision 
making processes in your community?






100  Observational data was only collected in those communities that remained safe enough to be accessible, where access 
to projects was granted by community leaders, and where projects were close enough to enumeration sites to be 
accessible. In treatment communities, enumerators observed 58% and 44% of community projects in treatment and 
control communities, respectively. The survey question is: ‘Assess the overall quality/accessibility of the project’. 
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Table F1 New community development project indicators  



















Dialogue -0.05 -0.01 0.14 0.19* 0.00 0.18 0.30** 0.47*** 
 (0.09) (0.11) (0.10) (0.11) (0.11) (0.14) (0.14) (0.14) 
         
Controls  No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes 
Control Y 
endline 
0.76 0.76 0.44 0.44 0.82 0.82 0.27 0.27 
R-sq. 0.003 0.171 0.021 0.314 0.000 0.323 0.089 0.368 
Observations 98 98 98 98 50 50 50 50 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
 
 
Appendix G DIALOGUE impact on engagement 
 
Table G1 DIALOGUE impact on engagement with state101 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Interactions Interactions Inclusivity Inclusivity 
Dialogue 0.01 0.01 0.10* 0.10 
 (0.04) (0.05) (0.06) (0.06) 
     
Baseline outcome  No Yes No Yes 
     
Controls  No Yes No Yes 
     
Village FE  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Control Y endline 0.10 0.10 0.59 0.59 
Control Y baseline 0.07 0.07 0.00 0.39 
R-sq. 0.331 0.346 0.438 0.446 
Observations 856 856 878 878 
Standard errors in parentheses. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
 
 
Table G2 DIALOGUE impact on engagement with non-state actors102 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 































Dialogue 0.06 0.06 -0.07 -0.08 0.07 0.08 0.17** 0.17** 0.23*** 0.23*** 
 (0.05) (0.05) (0.06) (0.06) (0.05) (0.05) (0.07) (0.07) (0.06) (0.06) 
           
Baseline 
outcome  
No No No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes 
           
Controls  No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes 
           
Village FE  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Control 
endline 
0.26 0.26 0.75 0.75 0.30 0.30 0.71 0.71 0.67 0.67 
Control 
baseline 
  0.72 0.72 0.71 0.67 0.68 0.68 0.70 0.70 
R-sq. 0.392 0.402 0.219 0.240 0.374 0.381 0.273 0.286 0.355 0.366 
Observations 867 867 874 874 867 867 876 876 847 847 




101  Survey questions: (i) in col. 1-2, ‘Please tell me whether you, personally, have done any of these things during the past 
year: Had any interaction with a district council official or tax collector?’; (ii) in col. 3-4, ‘Please tell me whether you, 
personally, have done any of these things during the past year. Had any interaction with a central government official or 
tax collector?’; (iii) in col. 5-6, ‘The district government involves me in the decision-making process in my community’ 
(likert-type question on agreement with the statement). 
102  Survey questions on interactions and inclusivity mirror those for state actors described in the previous footnote. 
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Appendix H DIALOGUE impact on performance 
 
Table H1 DIALOGUE impact on perceptions of the district government103 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Transparency Transparency Trust Trust Performance Performance 
Dialogue 0.14** 0.13** 0.15** 0.15** 0.12** 0.11** 
 (0.06) (0.06) (0.07) (0.07) (0.05) (0.05) 
       
Baseline 
outcome  
No Yes No Yes No Yes 
       
Controls  No Yes No Yes No Yes 
       
Village FE  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Control Y 
endline 
0.35 0.35 0.76 0.76 0.35 0.35 
Control Y 
baseline 
0.08 0.08 0.55 0.55 0.33 0.33 
R-sq. 0.405 0.410 0.384 0.395 0.500 0.513 
Observations 804 804 859 859 833 833 
Standard errors in parentheses. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
 
 
Table H2 DIALOGUE impact on perceptions of the village council 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Transparency Transparency Trust Trust Performance Performance 
Dialogue -0.09 -0.08 -0.03 -0.03 -0.16** -0.17** 
 (0.07) (0.06) (0.03) (0.03) (0.07) (0.07) 
       
Baseline outcome  No Yes No Yes No Yes 
       
Controls  No Yes No Yes No Yes 
       
Village FE  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Control Y endline 0.47 0.47 0.96 0.96 0.57 0.57 
Control Y baseline 0.20 0.20 0.95 0.95 0.71 0.71 
R-sq. 0.315 0.570 0.194 0.198 0.330 0.341 
Observations 819 819 877 877 857 857 
Standard errors in parentheses. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
 
 
Table H3 DIALOGUE impact on perceptions of religious leaders 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Transparency Transparency Trust Trust Performance Performance 
Dialogue 0.08 0.08 0.12** 0.13** 0.12* 0.13* 
 (0.06) (0.06) (0.05) (0.05) (0.06) (0.06) 
       
Baseline outcome  No Yes No Yes No Yes 
       
Controls  No Yes No Yes No Yes 
       
Village FE  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Control Y endline 0.48 0.48 0.85 0.85 0.48 0.48 
Control Y baseline 0.34 0.34 0.87 0.87 0.52 0.52 
R-sq. 0.333 0.346 0.338 0.351 0.358 0.363 
Observations 812 812 846 846 834 834 
Standard errors in parentheses. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
  
 
103  Survey questions: (i) in col. 1-2, ‘Based on your experience, how easy or difficult is it to do each of the following: To find 
out how the district government uses the revenues from people’s taxes and fees?’; (ii) in col. 3-4, ‘How much trust or 
mistrust do you have that the following groups/individuals act in the interest of ordinary people like you? The district 
government’; (iii) in col. 5-6, ‘During the past 12 months, do you think the following actor's performance has got better, 
stayed the same, or got worse? The district government’. 
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Table H4 DIALOGUE impact on perceptions of clan elders 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Transparency Transparency Trust Trust Performance Performance 
Dialogue 0.00 0.01 0.04 0.03 0.04 0.05 
 (0.06) (0.06) (0.05) (0.05) (0.06) (0.06) 
       
Baseline outcome  No Yes No Yes No Yes 
       
Controls  No Yes No Yes No Yes 
       
Village FE  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Control Y endline 0.51 0.51 0.87 0.87 0.44 0.44 
Control Y baseline 0.36 0.36 0.93 0.93 0.57 0.57 
R-sq. 0.304 0.312 0.287 0.302 0.340 0.348 
Observations 816 816 874 874 860 860 
Standard errors in parentheses. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
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